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ABSTRACT
In contemporary society, sustainability and public well-being have been pressing chal-
lenges. Some of the important questions are: how can sustainable practices, such as reducing
carbon emission, be encouraged? , How can a healthy lifestyle be maintained? Even though
individuals are interested, they are unable to adopt these behaviors due to resource con-
straints. Developing a framework to enable cooperative behavior adoption and to sustain
it for a long period of time is a major challenge. As a part of developing this framework,
I am focusing on methods to understand behavior diffusion over time.
Facilitating behavior diffusion with resource constraints in a large population is qual-
itatively different from promoting cooperation in small groups. Previous work in social
sciences has derived conditions for sustainable cooperative behavior in small homoge-
neous groups. However, how groups of individuals having resource constraint co-operate
over extended periods of time is not well understood, and is the focus of my thesis.
I develop models to analyze behavior diffusion over time through the lens of epidemic
models with the condition that individuals have resource constraint. I introduce an epi-
demic model SVRS ( Susceptible-Volatile-Recovered-Susceptible) to accommodate mul-
tiple behavior adoption. I investigate the longitudinal effects of behavior diffusion by
varying different properties of an individual such as resources,threshold and cost of be-
havior adoption. I also consider how behavior adoption of an individual varies with her
knowledge of global adoption.
I evaluate my models on several synthetic topologies like complete regular graph, pref-
erential attachment and small-world and make some interesting observations. Periodic
injection of early adopters can help in boosting the spread of behaviors and sustain it for a
longer period of time. Also, behavior propagation for the classical epidemic model SIRS
(Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible) does not continue for an infinite period of
time as per conventional wisdom.
i
One interesting future direction is to investigate how behavior adoption is affected
when number of individuals in a network changes. The affects on behavior adoption
when availability of behavior changes with time can also be examined.
ii
To my Family.
iii
It has been an exciting and enriching journey towards my thesis. I am indebted to
several people who have contributed directly and indirectly to my thesis. I would like to
express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Hari Sundaram for his patient guid-
ance, inspiring thoughts and useful critiques during my master’s study. His enthusiastic
attitude towards research always inspired me throughout this journey. His approach to
problem formulation and presentation of the same is a quality, which I try to emulate and
has totally transformed my attitude towards research. Besides my advisor, I would like to
thank Dr. Hasan Davulcu and Dr. Pavan Turaga for agreeing to be a part of my thesis
committee and providing insightful comments on my thesis.
I would like to offer my special thanks to Kaushik Sarkar, for providing stimulating dis-
cussions and helpful hints whenever I was stuck on a problem.
Last but not the least, this thesis would not have been possible without the support of
my entire family. I wish to thank my grandparents, my parents and my sister for their
endless love and unconditional support. No words are enough to express my gratitude
for all that they had to sacrifice and endure so that I may have this opportunity.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Epidemic Models of Behavior Diffusion in Social Networks with Re-
source Constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 The Problem Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Main Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 How varying resource availability of an individual can shape
the behavior diffusion over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 What happens when adoption threshold of each individual vary
over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.3 Can change in the behavior adoption cost affect behavior distri-
bution
in the long term? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.4 How does the resource utilization change with varying global in-
fluence over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Contribution of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 RELATED WORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Information Cascades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.1 Diffusion in Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 Modeling Diffusion through a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.3 Knowledge, Thresholds, and Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
v
CHAPTER Page
2.1.4 Applications of Social Network Analyzes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Epidemic Diffusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 DESCRIPTIONS OF EPIDEMIC MODELS OF BEHAVIOR ADOPTION
UNDER RESOURCE CONSTRAINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 A Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Social Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Model Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Measurement of the Diffusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.1 Total Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.2 Total Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.3 Resource Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 SVS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SVS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6 SIR Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.7 SIRS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.8 SVRS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.8.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SVRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
vi
CHAPTER Page
3.9 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4 VARYING PARAMETERS OVER TIME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 How varying resource availability of an individual can shape the
behavior diffusion over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1.1 Description of Model Resource Availability Variation . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1.2 Fixing the values of α for resource availability variation. . . . . . . . 50
4.1.3 Simulation Setup for Varying Resource Availability Over Time 51
4.1.4 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior . . . . . . . 51
4.2 What happens when adoption threshold of each individual vary over time? 56
4.2.1 Mathematical Model for Varying Threshold Over Time . . . . . . . 57
4.2.2 Simulation Setup for adoption threshold variation over time . . 57
4.2.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Can change in the behavior adoption cost affects behavior distribution
in the long term? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.1 Mathematical Model for Varying Adoption Cost Over Time . . 60
4.3.2 Simulation setup for varying adoption cost over time . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior . . . . . . . . 61
4.4 How does the resource utilization change with varying global influence
over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4.1 Mathematical Model of Varying Global Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4.2 Simulation setup for global influence variation over time . . . . . . 63
4.4.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior . . . . . . . 63
4.5 What happens when combinations of parameters varies over time? . . . . . . . 65
4.5.1 Simulation Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
vii
CHAPTER Page
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 Research Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2.1 Behavior Duration Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2.2 Varying Adoption Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2.3 Varying Adoption Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.4 Varying Resource Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.5 Varying Global Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 Improvements to the frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3.1 Network Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3.2 Representation of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.1 Noisy Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.2 Change in population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.3 Change in behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
APPENDIX
A Experimental Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
3.1 Epidemic behavior models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Common Terminologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.1 Design of Experimental Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.2 Terminologies used in experimental sequence design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
3.1 Sufficient social signal, intent and resource make an individual a candidate
for adoption of a behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Payoff for adopting a behavior comes from an individual’s intent and so-
cial signal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 The three behaviors - (1) recycling, (2) using public transport, and (3) eat-
ing organic food with respective costs as well as the network is shown.
The intrinsic utility of the behaviors are same as the cost. So c1 = u1 =
0.2, c2 = u2 = 0.5, c3 = u3 = 0.7. Resource of the node v, r (v) = 0.6, and
the thresholds are - θ1(v) = 0.1, θ2(v) = 0.4, θ3 = 0.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 This is the network at time step 0. All three of the neighbors of v have
adopted recycling, two of them have adopted public transport, and only
one of them is eating organic food. v has not adopted any behavior yet.
The local influences for the three behaviors are as follows - l1(v) = 1.0, l2(v) =
0.66, l3(v) = 0.33. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 Local influence for organic food is less than the threshold, i.e l3(v) <
θ3(v). So v will not consider organic food for adoption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.6 c1 + c2 > r (v), so v’s resource is insufficient for adopting both recycling
and public transport. Payoff for recycling, p1(v) = 0.5×0.2+0.5×1.0 =
0.6, and public transport, p2(v) = 0.5× 0.5+ 0.5× 0.66 = 0.58 (w = 0.5).
For v the payoff for recycling is higher than the payoff for using public
transport though the intrinsic utility of public transport is higher than
that of recycling. So v will adopt recycling at the end of time step 1. . . . . . . 35
x
Figure Page
3.7 State-Diagram for SV S model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt a behavior. An individual remains in the sus-
ceptible state if local utility l iv of behavior i for node v is lower than the
threshold θiv for behavior i , or dropped in knapsack KS. Once the re-
quired conditions are met, node v adopts behavior i and moves to the
volatile (V ) state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.8 SVS model , key observation is the decrease in resource utilization as the
number of neighbors increases. Fixed Parameters :Number of nodes =
100 , number of seeds = 10 , number of behavior = 1 , cost of behavior
= 0.5 , utility = 0.5 , infected duration = 2 , recovered duration = 1 ,
seed selection algo= hill climbing , seed distribution= uniform. Varying
Parameters : Epidemic Model used = SVS ,Network Topologies = [PA ,
smallworld , regular-complete-graph] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.9 State-Diagram for SI R Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt a behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i
and transforms to infected I state if local utility l iv of behavior i for node v
is greater than the threshold θiv for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack
K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected duration) times. After dI
period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains there for
an infinite amount of time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
xi
Figure Page
3.10 Experiment for SI R model over three different topologies and we observe
the behavior to remain in the system for longer period of time in case
of smallworld and complete regular graph comparing it with PA. Fixed
parameter are : Number of nodes = 100 , number of seeds = 10 , number
of behavior = 1 , cost of behavior = 0.5 , utility = 0.5 , infected duration
= 2 , recovered duration = 1 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed
distribution = uniform . Varying Parameters : Epidemic Model used =
SIR, Network Topologies are PA, SW, CompleteRegularGraph] . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.11 State-Diagram for SI RS Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i
and transforms to infected I state if local utility l iv of behavior i for node v
is greater than the threshold θiv for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack
K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected duration) times. After dI
period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains there for
dR (recovered duration) period of time before converting to susceptible state. 43
3.12 SIRS Model where interestingly we observe the behavior propagation is
network dependent and dies out after a period of time in contrary of clas-
sical wisdom- Fixed Parameters :Number of nodes= 100 , number of seeds
= 10 , number of behavior = 1 , cost of behavior = 0.5 , utility = 0.5 ,
infected duration = 2 , recovered duration = 1 , seed selection algo = hill
climbing , seed distribution = uniform , resource = fixed , Threshold =
fixed . Controlled Parameters : Epidemic Model used = SIRS , Network
Topologies = PA, SW, CompleteRegularGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
xii
Figure Page
3.13 State-Diagram for SV RS Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i
and transforms to infected I state if local utility V of behavior i for node v
is greater than the threshold θiv for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack
K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected duration) times. After dI
period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains there for
dR (recovered duration) period of time before converting to susceptible state. 46
3.14 SVRS Model captures the periodic nature of an individual’s behavior adop-
tion. Interestingly the effect of seeds nodes is on the first period only
and eventually resource utilization decreases with time - Fixed Parameters
:Number of nodes = 100 , number of seeds = 10 , number of behavior =
1 , cost of behavior = 0.5 , utility = 0.5 , infected duration = 2 , recov-
ered duration = 1 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribution
= uniform , resource = fixed , Threshold = fixed . Varying Parameters
: Epidemic Model Used = SVRS , Network Topologies = PA, SW and
CompleteRegularGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Resource Variation with time using SIR model on PA network - Fixed
Parameters are number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds 10 , number
of behavior 1 , cost of behavior 0.5 , utility 0.5 , infected duration 5 ,
recovered duration 2 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribu-
tion = uniform , Threshold average over 1000 runs . Varying Parameters
: Epidemic Duration Model is SVRS, Network Topology as PA. We are
comparing between “Weekend Peaks“ and “Random Peaks“. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
xiii
Figure Page
4.2 Resource Variation with time using SIRS model on PA network -Fixed
Parameters are number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds 10 , number
of behavior 1 , cost of behavior 0.5 , utility 0.5 , infected duration 4 ,
recovered duration 3 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribu-
tion uniform , Threshold average over 1000 runs . Varying Parameters
: Epidemic Duration Model is SVRS, Network Topology as PA. We are
comparing between “Weekend Peaks“ and “Random Peaks“. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Resource Variation with time using SIRS model on PA network - Fixed
Parameters are number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds 10 , number
of behavior 1 , cost of behavior 0.5 , utility 0.5 , infected duration 4 ,
recovered duration 8 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribu-
tion = uniform , Threshold average over 1000 runs . Varying Parameters
: Epidemic Duration Model is SVRS, Network Topology as PA. We are
comparing between “Weekend Peaks“ and “Random Peaks“.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Resource Variation with time using SIRS model on PA network - Fixed
Parameters are number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds 10 , number
of behavior 1 , cost of behavior 0.5 , utility 0.5 , infected duration 4 ,
recovered duration 8 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribu-
tion = uniform , Threshold average over 1000 runs . Varying Parameters
: Epidemic Duration Model is SVRS, Network Topology as PA. We are
comparing between “Weekend Peaks“ and “Random Peaks“.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
xiv
Figure Page
4.5 SV RS- PA Threshold Ratio Variation ,α = 0.2-There are two parame-
ters, we fixed few parameters like Number of nodes as 100 , number of
seeds as 10 , number of behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as 0.5 , behavior
utility 0.5 , infected duration as 2 , recovered duration 1 , seed selection
algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g , seed distribution as uni f o r m. We perform all
experiments by averaging 1000 threshold runs. The varying parameters
are “Threshold variation “ and “No Threshold Variation“. Also we as-
sign 70% of the population to have positive effect on threshold variation
and 30% population will have negative effect. We assign threshold drop
or gain to 0.2. Both the threshold drop/gain and the percentage of pop-
ulation having positive and negative effects are assigned after extensive
experimental study and careful observation. All results are given in the
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.6 SV RS- PA Cost Variation , α = 0.2 -We perform all our experiments un-
der the following conditions. There are two parameters, we fixed few pa-
rameters like Number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as 10 , number of
behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as 0.5 , behavior utility 0.5 , infected du-
ration as 2 , recovered duration 1 , seed selection algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g
, seed distribution as uni f o r m. We perform all experiments by averag-
ing 1000 threshold runs. The varying parameters are “Cost variation “
and “No Cost Variation“. We assign constant as 10 and the cost variation
drop as 0.2. Both the adoption cost drop and the constant are assigned
after extensive experimental study and careful observation. All results are
given in the Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
xv
Figure Page
4.7 We perform all our experiments under the following conditions. There
are two parameters, we fixed few parameters like Number of nodes as 100
, number of seeds as 10 , number of behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as
0.5 , behavior utility 0.5 , infected duration as 2 , recovered duration 1 ,
seed selection algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g , seed distribution as uni f o r m. We
perform all experiments by averaging 1000 threshold runs. The varying
parameters are “Global Influence Variation “ and “No Global Influence
Variation“. We assign ratio of population as 70 : 30, i.e 70 % of the popula-
tion will have positive effect to the variation of global influence over time
whereas , 30 % of the population will have negative effect of the global in-
fluence. This ratio of population is assigned after extensive experimental
study and careful observations. All results are given in the Appendix . . . . . 64
xvi
Figure Page
4.8 This is comparative study of parameter combinations. We use short forms
to represent the combinations. There “BM” is the base model where no
variation of parameters are taking place. Starting from right hand side, we
look into “T” , where adoption threshold is varying over time. Then “C”
is the adoption cost variation . We represent variation of resource avail-
ability by “R”. “GI” is the short form of global influence variation over
time. Then combinations like “T + C ” is the case where both threshold
and cost are varying with time. “C + R ” is another scenario where both
adoption cost and the resource availability varies. We present variation of
cost , resource availability and threshold by “C+R+T”. In the above men-
tioned experiments we only consider local social signal on an individual ,
now we present the additive effect of global influence variation in the case
of “ C+R+T+GI”. Note that all the constant are already fixed in previous
sections. Here we are concentrating on combinational effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.1 SV RS- PA Threshold Alpha Variation ,rat i o = 0.7 - This is an extensive
study on threshold variation to identify the threshold drop/gain keeping
population ration as 70 : 30 , i.e 70 % of the population will have positive
effect and 30 % of the population will have negative effect over long time
periods. We identify alpha as 0.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
xvii
Figure Page
A.2 SV RS- PA Threshold Ratio Variation ,α= 0.2 - This is an extensive study
on threshold variation to identify the ratio of population who will have
positive or negative impact. By positive impact of threshold, we mean
that the intention to perform a behavior of an individual will increase.
Similarly , negative effect of threshold means that the intention to perform
a behavior will decrease. We perform population ratio variation keeping
alpha as 0.2 and the ratio 70 : 30 in the most interesting combination. . . . . 86
A.3 SV RS- PA Cost α Variation , C ons t ant = 10 - This is an extensive study
on cost variation to identify the drop in adoption cost i .e the alpha over
time. In this experiment, we kept constant as 10 and varied alpha to find
the most appropriate alpha value. We observe that alpha as 0.2 is the most
interesting value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A.4 SV RS- PA Cost Constant Variation , α= 0.2 - This is an extensive study
on cost variation to identify the constant in adoption cost over time. In
this experiment, we kept α as 0.2 which we obtained form the previous
experiment and varied constant over five values. After careful observation
we find constant value as 10 to be the most appropriate one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
A.5 SV RS- PA Resource variation with Weekend Peaks - In this experiment ,
we vary the average weekend resource availability. We observe if the aver-
age population weekend resource is 50% of their full resource then there
are distinct peaks during weekends. As we are targeting population to
have significantly higher resources during weekends , hence we are taking
value as 50% for rest of the experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
xviii
Figure Page
A.6 SV RS- PA Global Influence Ratio Variation - In this experiment , we are
varying the ratio of population having positive effects and negative effect
over global influence variation. By positive effect means , an individual
will be more keen to adopt a behavior if the global influence increases.
And by negative effect we mean , an individual will be reluctant to adopt
a behavior with increase in global influence. We perform a study with
various population ratio and we observe that 70 : 30 ratio i.e 70% popu-
lation having positive effect and 30 % population having negative effect is
the most significant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.7 SV RS- PA Threshold and Cost Variation α = 0.2 and cons t ant = 10 -
In this experiment, we are varying both behavior adoption threshold and
behavior cost over time. Note that we are fixing all the constants from
previous experiments. Interestingly, we observe a statistically significant
increase in resource utilization when both threshold and cost are varying
together. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.8 SV RS- PA Cost and Resource Variation - In this experiment, we are vary-
ing both behavior cost and resource availability over time. Note that we
are fixing all the constants from previous experiments by setting weekend−
rat i o = 0.5 and α= 0.2 . We observe that there is no significant increase
in resource utilization but the resource variation among the population
increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
xix
Figure Page
A.9 SV RS- PA Threshold and Resource Variation - In this experiment, we are
varying both behavior adoption threshold and resource availability over
time. Note that we are fixing all the constants from previous experiments
by setting α = 0.2 and weekendr at i o = 0.5 . We observe that there is
no significant increase in resource utilization but the resource variation
among the population increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.10 SV RS- PA Threshold , Cost and Resource Variation - In this experiment,
we are varying both behavior adoption threshold , behavior cost and re-
source availability over time. Note that we are fixing all the constants
from previous experiments by setting weekendr at i o = 0.5 , α= 0.2 and
pos i t i ver at i o = 0.7. Interestingly, we observe that there is no signifi-
cant increase in resource utilization but the resource variation among the
population increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.11 SV RS- PA Threshold , Cost ,Resource and Global Influence Variation -
In this experiment, we are varying both behavior adoption threshold , be-
havior cost , resource availability and global influence over time. Note
that we are fixing all the constants from previous experiments. Interest-
ingly, we observe a statistically significant increase in resource utilization
when all the parameters are varying together and there is an increase in
the range of resource availability among the population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
xx
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In this highly competitive and fast paced world , all of us want to accomplished a lot
but are inhibited by several constraints on our resources. Even if an individual adopts a
behavior, sustaining it over a long period of time is challenging. The question , why do
even highly motivated individuals lose interest over time? intrigued me to pursue with my
research in a quest to understand the reason. It is a challenging question, and one reason
may be the core idea that people may not have resources to perform it. I am interested in
understanding what happens when we incentivize a group of individuals in a community
to adopt a behavior, assuming that not all individuals have enough resources to perform
it.
Even ten years ago large scale social networking sites were thought to be a novel and
emerging field. Now, most teenagers wake up and “Facebook“ or “Tweet“ their thoughts
or whereabouts. Everything changes and so has the way we communicate or think. Posts
of a friend riding a cool bike can influence others to take up biking. At the same time,
this motivation can die down over a period of time. This leads to the next question of
my research - is motivation cyclical? This has parallels in epidemiology, and through my
research I am trying to explore that connection.
In Section 1.1, we introduce the idea of behavior diffusion in social network with
resource constraint and it’s parallels with epidemic models. In the following section, we
present the context of our problem. In Section 1.3, we discuss the main research ques-
tions.
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1.1 Epidemic Models of Behavior Diffusion in Social Networks with Resource
Constraints
There has been a growing interest in social network analysis [26] , [51] , [54] , [60],
[53] , [73], [31] fueled by the explosive growth of the Internet and online communities
like Facebook, Twitter as well as blog , collaboration and email networks. A social net-
work is essentially a graph of relationships and interactions among social entities such as
individuals, groups of individuals, and organizations. It plays a critical role as a medium
for the propagation of information, ideas, and influence among its members. Use of cell
phones among college students or the rise of a political movement in an unstable society,
as it did in the case of Egyptian population in the wake of gag order from the dictatorial
government on local print media, provides a good example.
Social media can also be a powerful catalyst for environmental / social sustainability.
Consider the case, when the habit of eco-friendly transportation alternatives needs to be
spread among daily commuters or when the problem of obesity in population needs to be
addressed through a profusion of awareness of group activities among individuals. These
kinds of problems are termed as collective action problems [74] in the social sciences.
It is noteworthy that, information or shared idea diffusion can either die out quickly or
make significant inroads into the general population. It is exciting that with the advent
of social networks, communication and trust formation becomes easy and less costly. It’s
possible that social network can increase the chances of sustainable behavior adoption.
We are motivated by collective action problems. To answer questions such as how does
a person‘s limited resource, including time and money affect how she participates in real-
world activities? How can change of network dynamics (like reducing the adoption cost
or increasing the number of participants) affect her participation over time? A person’s
interest to adopt a new behavior, like riding a bike instead of driving a car to work, can
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be restricted due to lack of resources. In the real world, we are bombarded with choices
and may like to adopt multiple behaviors. However, adopting every behavior has some
cost involved with it. Current models of behavior adoption lack the idea that individuals
may have significant resource constraints that preclude them from successfully adopting
behaviors in which they are interested. Resource constraints not only limit individual
participation, but also shape how behaviors spread in a network. Some recent works
explored the resource constraint paradigm and presented seed selection mechanisms to
maximize the behavior diffusion. However, they do not incorporate the long term effect
of limited resources on behavior diffusion. Indeed, the change in network dynamics over
time and resource constraints can have significant effects on how behavior diffusion in a
social network shapes up.
The idea of sustained behaviors has parallels in epidemiology. Epidemic models namely
Susceptible-Infected-Recovery (SIR) and Susceptible-Infected-Recovery-Susceptible (SIRS)
[73] model the spread of an entity through a networked population .For example, in the
spread of a disease through a population, contact between an infectious and a susceptible
individual can lead to the transmission of infection. In a similar way, individuals or groups
adopting a behavior can motivate other individuals or groups to adopt the behavior given
they have the necessary resources. In SIR model, an infectious individual gets recovered
after a period of time, similarly an individual can let go of an adopted behavior after a
period of time.
1.2 The Problem Context
In this thesis, we present a model for multiple behavior diffusion that captures the
complex dynamics of multiple behavior adoption in resource constrained networks over
time. Our model has associated costs, utilities and adoption duration that are independent
of the individual. Mindful of the work by Aral, Muchnik, and Sundararajan [4] and
3
Shalizi and Thomas [63], individuals in our model evaluate a utility function for each
behavior combining intrinsic interest and social signals. An individual adopts behavior
when she receives a social signal which is higher than her adoption threshold and when
she has the resources to do so. In this study, we use three metrics: resource utilization,
total adoption in the network and unique number of participants.
In our work on diffusion of behavior, the process of behavior adoption by an indi-
vidual plays a central role. Adoption of behavior has been studied extensively in social
psychology. Specifically, our model of behavior adoption by an individual is motivated
by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) postulated in [2]. According to this theory,
attitude towards a behavior, subjective norm (or social pressure) and perceived behavioral
control constitute the intention of adopting a behavior. Empirical studies show that not
only intention is a good predictor of the actual behavior, but also it plays a direct causal
role, i.e. with sufficiently high intention and actual control over behavior, an individ-
ual is expected to engage in the behavior whenever opportunity arises. Attitude towards
a behavior from TPB motivates the concept of global utility for each behavior in our
model. Similarly, the local influence in our diffusion model can be seen as playing the
part of subjective norm (where the only referent is the social acquaintances). The notion
of individual resource constraint in our behavior diffusion model mirrors the notion of
perceived behavior control in TPB. However our work is markedly different from the
related works in social psychology in two major aspects. In most of the works in social
psychology, the main focus is on the individual. Although individuals play an important
role in our model, we also consider the underlying social network connecting the individ-
uals. Another subtle difference is that our model presents a dynamic view of the situation
where the subjective norm or social pressure changes over time, and thereby enabling us
to study the longitudinal shift in the pattern of behavior adoption. In contrast, the so-
cial psychological studies are snapshot studies providing at best a measure of correlation
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between before and after the snapshot point. Nevertheless, it can be said that the role of
TPB in relation to our model is similar to that of a rational agent in relation to modern
micro-economic theory.
1.3 Main Research Questions
Assume that you have a network of individuals and each individuals are connected to
their neighbors in certain topologies. There are N individuals with defined resources, and
are connected together with m edges. In the beginning, through an advertising campaign
for example,k individuals are selected to be the seeds and the behavior will diffuse through
the population over time. In my research, I am examining the following four questions
related to the above scenario.
1.3.1 How varying resource availability of an individual can shape
the behavior diffusion over time?
We model weekly resource variation, i.e individuals have access to different resources
each day of the week. We analyze two variants of resource availability. In the first variant,
all individuals have the majority of the resources available at the same time. For example,
you want to do charity work and the majority of individuals have time during weekends.
In the second variant, individuals vary in availability of their different resources. People
answering to questions in an online forum can serve as a good example for this. Some
individuals may want to set 30 mins every day of the week and some may set 4 hrs on a
Saturday for participating in such forums.
1.3.2 What happens when adoption threshold of each individual vary over time?
In the Linear Threshold model, individuals are assigned a fixed threshold which never
varies over time. However in the real world, the intent to adopt a behavior can change
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over time. For example, if a product becomes extremely popular, a person may be more
inclined to adopt it as her threshold will drop.On the other hand, if you are an early
adopter and you don’t adopt the behavior in the beginning, you may become reluctant to
adopt the behavior once it gets popular.
1.3.3 Can change in the behavior adoption cost affect behavior distribution
in the long term?
In classical behavior adoption models, the cost of adopting a behavior does not change
with time.In our model, we incorporate variation in behavior adoption cost over time.
As an example, consider an individual riding a bike. In the beginning, the adoption of the
behavior is costly as the individual spends time learning the skill, but as she gets better it
becomes easier to perform. The cost can become lower when a skill gets acquired through
performing the behavior repeatedly. Even after acquiring a skill, a base cost i.e. the base
effort to perform the behavior, still remains.
1.3.4 How does the resource utilization change with varying global influence over time?
This is a variant of the Linear Threshold model which assumes that each node of the
network is aware of the behavior adopted only by its neighbors. In our model, we are
appending the influence of global adoption to the basic LT model. It has been seen in a
prior experiment that the guests in a hotel reacts to the global adoption of behavior. Half
of the guests received a note telling them to save water by reusing their towels, and the
other half received one saying that more than 80 % of the guests previously have helped
in conserving water by reusing the towels. It was inferred that the guests receiving the
latter note adopted more to reusing the towels than their counterparts. Thus, showing
that with global influence over time, an individual can be impacted.
6
1.4 Contribution of the thesis
The following are the main contribution of this thesis.
• We introduced an epidemic model SVRS (Susceptible-Volatile-Recovered-Susceptible)
which is suitable for multiple behavior adoption.
• We looked into all variation of adoption parameters over time , like resource avail-
ability , behavior adoption costs, behavior adoption threshold and varying global
influence .
• We also extended our model to investigate the scenarios where combinations of
parameter variations took place .
1.5 Organization of the thesis
The next chapter discusses the related works on Information Diffusion and Epidemic
models. Then, Chapter 3 on page 27 introduces the detailed problem description and de-
scribes the multiple behavior diffusion model. It also talks about the performance metrics
used for evaluation of effectiveness. A description of influencing parameters and architec-
ture to vary those parameters over time are mentioned in Chapter 4 on page 48. It also
elaborates the simulation experiments starting from the network topologies to the results
obtained from simulations. Finally, conclusive discussions with possible extensions and
open issues are presented in Chapter 5 on page 69.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORKS
We review all related literature to our work in this chapter. The literature can be catego-
rized into two parts: Information Cascade and Epidemic Diffusion.
2.1 Information Cascades
“ When people are connected by a network, it becomes possible for them to influence each
other’s behavior and decisions.” [24]
Kleinberg described this basic principle results in a number of social processes where
networks tend to accumulate individual behavior to produce population wide collective
outcomes. What products people buy, the opinions they hold, the different activities they
perform, the technologies that define their lives and various other things put together can
make nearly a limitless set of circumstances where a person can be influenced by another.
The desire here is to understand why these influences occur and to rationally realize why
one should sometimes imitate other’s choice though his own information might suggest
otherwise.
Kempe et al [41] discussed in their paper which set of individuals to target to trigger
bigger cascades in a social network. Using submodular function based analysis framework
Kempe et al [42] have studied two basic diffusion models namely - Independent Cascade
Model and Linear Threshold Model. Their result shows 63 % performance improvement
guarantee as compared to the previous node selection heuristics based on the degree and
distance centrality. Calculating σ(A), the influence function is tricky, and authors have
used large-scale simulations to define the influence function. It is almost impossible to
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evaluate the influence function for real life applications by running simulations. Thus in
our case, we used resource utilization and total adoption in the network as the metric for
measuring the effectiveness.
Watt’s journal [74] starts with the idea of influential nodes, which is used extensively
in marketing and diffusion research. Influential(s) refers to a minority of individuals in a
group whose influence is important to the formation of public opinion. By using differ-
ent models and computer simulations, he figured out that social change takes place, not
because of a few influentials, but by a group of easily influenced individuals, which he re-
ferred as a critical mass. He also showed that attributes of influentials are mostly accidents
of timing and location than any special characteristics.Also, social changes are highly de-
pendent on group structure, only if the right global combination of conditions exists. In
our model, we used the concept of influentials in order to perform seed selection.
Leskovec et al [33] in their paper investigated the problem of tracing paths of in-
formation diffusion and influence. During information diffusion, it is often possible to
directly observe when nodes become infected, but observing exactly who infects whom
or who influences whom is a very difficult task. In many applications, network topology
for propagations is unknown. Leskovec et al [44] addressed these challenges by develop-
ing a method for tracing paths of diffusion and influence through networks and inferring
the networks over which contagions propagate. The efficient approximation algorithm
they proposed scales to large datasets and gives near-optimal performance. Kleinberg et al
focused on maximizing spread of behavior through a social network with a known topol-
ogy while Leskovec et al attempted to define structure of the underlying network given
information spreading is taking place.
Watts n Strogatz in their work on small world dynamics [72] have shown how a
regular graph can be transformed into a “small world ” graph by random rewiring where
rewiring probability 0 implies completely regular topology and 1 imply completely chaotic
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topology. They studied the scenario when the probability lies between 0 and 1. They
further probed the functional significance of small-world connectivity for dynamical sys-
tems. In our work, we have chosen small world as one of the representative network
topology under multiple behaviors diffusion condition with resource constraint and epi-
demic scenario.
The origin of large but rare cascades that are triggered by small initial shocks is a phe-
nomenon that manifests itself as diversely as cultural fads, collective action, the diffusion
of norms and innovations, and cascading failures in infrastructure and organizational net-
works. Watts in the paper [73] presents a possible explanation of this phenomenon in
terms of a sparse, random network of interacting agents whose decisions are determined
by the actions of their neighbors according to a simple threshold rule. Two regimes are
identified in which the network is susceptible to very large cascades - herein called global
cascades - that occur very rarely. When cascade propagation is limited by the connectiv-
ity of the network, a power law distribution of cascade sizes is observed, analogous to the
cluster size distribution in standard percolation theory and avalanches in self-organized
criticality. But when the network is highly connected, cascade propagation is limited in-
stead by the local stability of the nodes themselves, and the size distribution of cascades
is bimodal, implying a more extreme kind of instability that is correspondingly harder
to anticipate. In the first regime, where the distribution of network neighbors is highly
skewed, it is found that the most connected nodes are far more likely than average nodes
to trigger cascades, but not in the second regime. Finally, it is shown that heterogeneity
plays an ambiguous role in determining a system’s stability: increasingly heterogeneous
thresholds make the system more vulnerable to global cascades; but an increasingly het-
erogeneous degree distribution makes it less vulnerable.
Bakshy et. al. [6] studied and modeled social influence based on the change in adop-
tion rate due to the actions of one’s friend using the social game Second Life [1] as a test
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bed. They found out that the adoption rate quickens as the number of friends adopting
increases and this effect varies with the connectivity of a particular user. They further
found that sharing among friends occurs more rapidly than sharing among strangers.
Lastly, they examine the role of individuals, finding that some play a more active role
in distributing content than others but that these influencers are distinct from the early
adopters.
Bakshy et. al. didn’t factor in the effect of fees on the transfer of assets, which we
have considered as cost of adopting behavior. It is worth exploring, how an individual’s
behavior to accept asset changes when assets are costly to acquire i.e. when every behavior
comes with a cost of adoption. Another interesting dimension they didn’t explore is the
long-term epidemic effect. Long-term epidemic effect of behavioral adoption may inhibit
the spread of assets, favoring the spread of those where users adopts behavior and does
not let go off their behaviors. The notion of temporal behavior adoption is shaped into
our model using different epidemic modeling schemes.
Chen et. al. [18] , [19] studied the influence maximization problem from comple-
mentary directions - to improve the original greedy algorithm espoused by Kempe et al
[42] and to propose new degree discount heuristics that improve influence spread. Their
analysis is based on single behavior diffusion and doesn’t consider other aspects of behav-
ior propagation - namely, cost of behavior or time span of the behavior adoption.
Kleinberg [22] studied sequential influence models in social networks. The spread of
influence among individuals in a social network can be naturally modeled in a probabilis-
tic framework, but it is challenging to reason about differences between various models
as well as to relate these models to actual social network data. In the paper they consid-
ered two of the most fundamental definitions of influence, one based on a small set of
“snapshot”’ observations of a social network and the other based on detailed temporal
dynamics. The former is particularly useful because large-scale social network data sets
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are often available only in snapshots or crawls. The latter however provides a more de-
tailed process model of how influence spreads. They studied the relationship between
these two ways of measuring influence, in particular establishing how to infer the more
detailed temporal measure from the more readily observable snapshot measure. They val-
idated their analysis using the history of social interactions on Wikipedia; the result is the
first large-scale study to exhibit a direct relationship between snapshot and temporal mod-
els of social influence. In our research we exhibits a dynamic study of behavior adoption
over time.
Banerjee [8] , in his work showed an example, a person is in an unfamiliar town and
she chooses Restaurant A through her own research. Upon reaching the place she finds
it deserted but sees restaurant B is full. Now, if she takes into account that the diners in
restaurant B have similar taste to hers and that they have their own set of information
about the place then the logical choice for her is restaurant B. To analyze this further it
can be assumed that each diner had imperfect but independent information about which
restaurant is better. So, if restaurant B has more diners then it means that the collective in-
formation is more powerful than the person’s private one and making this choice logical.
In this case, we say that herding, or an information cascade, has occurred. This concept
was also developed in other work around the same time by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch [12] , [75].
Thus, it can be said that an information cascade can take place when people make
decisions sequentially. That is when people infer the result by observing their former
counterparts and their actions, as is the case with the restaurant example. Here, people
are not taking decisions on basis of being blind followers but informant ones, which is
creating a information cascade. This is thus informed imitation though in many cases
imitation does occur due to the desire to conform. Consider for example the following
experiment performed by Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz in the 1960s [66]. In this
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experiment, people were asked to look up at the sky and the impact of this action on
passerby was noted. It was seen when one person was standing looking up, almost no
one notices. Then, when around 5 people were looking up a few noticed but not a very
significant number. But, when around 15 people stood and looked up almost 45
It was observed that the force to conform becomes greater if the group involved in
conforming becomes larger. Another explanation for this can also be information cascade.
Initially with fewer numbers, passersby did not see a rational need to look up, but with
growing number it was but logical to see if the information was there at all. Ultimately,
information cascades may be at least part of the explanation for many types of imitation in
social settings. This can be seen in everyday life where people do imitate others believing
their information to be well thought out.
2.1.1 Diffusion in Networks
We now connect these two approaches by exploring some of the decision-making prin-
ciples that can be used to model individual decision-making in a social network, leading
people to align their behaviors with those of their network neighbors. The Diffusion of
Innovations. We will consider specifically how new behaviors, practices, opinions, con-
ventions, and technologies spread from person to person through a social network, as
people influence their friends to adopt new ideas. Our understanding of how this process
works is built on a long history of empirical work in sociology known as the diffusion
of innovations [21], [59] , [67]. A number of now-classic studies done in the middle
of the 20th century established a basic research strategy for studying the spread of a new
technology or idea through a group of people, and analyzing the factors that facilitated or
impeded its progress. Some of these early studies focused on cases in which the person-
to-person influence was due primarily to informational effects: as people observed the
decisions of their network neighbors, it provided indirect information that led them to
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try the innovation as well. Two of the most influential early pieces of research to capture
such informational effects were
Ryan and Gross’s study of the adoption of hybrid seed corn among farmers in Iowa
[61] and Coleman, Katz, and Menzel’s study of the adoption of tetracycline by physicians
in the United States [21] . In Ryan and Gross’s study, they interviewed farmers to deter-
mine how and when they decided to begin using hybrid seed corn; they found that while
most of the farmers in their study first learned about hybrid seed corn from salesmen,
most were first convinced to try using it based on the experience of neighbors in their
community. Coleman, Katz, and Menzel went further when they studied the adoption
of a new drug by doctors, mapping out the social connections among the doctors making
decisions about adoption.
While these two studies clearly concerned very different communities and very dif-
ferent innovations, they - like other important studies of that period - shared a number
of basic ingredients. In both cases, the novelty and initial lack of understanding of the in-
novation made it risky to adopt, but it was ultimately highly beneficial; in both cases, the
early adopters had certain general characteristics, including higher socio-economic status
and a tendency to travel more widely; and in both cases, decisions about adoption were
made in the context of a social structure where people could observe what their neighbors,
friends, and colleagues were doing.
Other important studies in the diffusion of innovations focused on settings in which
decisions about adoption were driven primarily by direct-benefit effects rather than in-
formational ones. A long line of diffusion research on communication technologies has
explored such direct-benefit effects; the spread of technologies such as the telephone, the
fax machine, and e-mail has depended on the incentives people have to communicate with
friends who have already adopted the technology [64], [47]. As studies of this type began
proliferating, researchers started to identify some of the common principles that applied
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across many different domains. In his influential book on the diffusion of innovations,
Everett Rogers gathered together and articulated a number of these principles [59], in-
cluding a set of recurring reasons why an innovation can fail to spread through a popu-
lation, even when it is has significant relative advantage compared to existing practices.
In particular, the success of an innovation also depends on its complexity for people to
understand and implement; its observability, so that people can become aware that others
are using it; its trial ability, so that people can mitigate its risks by adopting it gradually
and incrementally; and perhaps most crucially, its overall compatibility with the social
system that it is entering. Related to this, the principle of homophily can sometimes act
as a barrier to diffusion: since people tend to interact with others who are like them-
selves, while new innovations tend to arrive from “outside” the system, it can be difficult
for these innovations to make their way into a tightly-knit social community.
Shalizi [63] considered processes on social networks that can potentially involve three
factors: homophily, or the formation of social ties due to matching individual traits; social
contagion, also known as social influence; and the causal effect of an individual’s covari-
ates on their behavior or other measurable responses. They showed that, generically, all
of these are confounded with each other. Distinguishing them from one another requires
strong assumptions on the parametrization of the social process or on the adequacy of the
covariates used (or both). In particular they demonstrated, with simple examples, that
asymmetries in regression coefficients cannot identify causal effects, and that very sim-
ple models of imitation (a form of social contagion) can produce substantial correlations
between an individual’s enduring traits and their choices, even when there is no intrinsic
affinity between them. They also suggested some possible constructive responses to these
results.
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2.1.2 Modeling Diffusion through a Network
We build our model for the diffusion of a new behavior in terms of a more basic,
underlying model of individual decision-making: as individuals make decisions based on
the choices of their neighbors, a particular pattern of behavior can begin to spread across
the links of the network. To formulate such an individual-level model, it is possible to
start either from informational effects [27], [7], [32] or direct-benefit effects [13], [25],
[52] , [76]. In this chapter, we will focus on the latter, beginning with a natural model
of direct-benefit effects in networks due to Stephen Morris [52].Network models based
on direct-benefit effects involve the following underlying consideration: you have certain
social network neighbors | friends, acquaintances, or colleagues and the benefits to you
of adopting a new behavior increase as more and more of these neighbors adopt it. In
such a case, simple self-interest will dictate that you should adopt the new behavior once
a sufficient proportion of your neighbors have done so. For example, you may find it
easier to collaborate with co-workers if you are using compatible technologies; similarly,
you may find it easier to engage in social interaction all else being equal with people whose
beliefs and opinions are similar to yours.
One of the fundamental things we learn from studying diffusion is that there is a cru-
cial difference between learning about a new idea and actually deciding to adopt it. This
contrast was already important in the early days of diffusion research. For example, Fig-
ure 19.10 comes from the original Ryan-Gross study of hybrid seed corn [61]; it shows
a clear wave of awareness of this innovation that significantly precedes the wave of adop-
tions. Our models also illustrate this contrast. If we imagine that people first hear about
an innovation when any of their neighbors first adopts, then we see for example in Figure
19.5 that nodes 4 and 9 are aware of A as a new behavior right away, but it takes fur-
ther time for them to actually adopt it. In an even stronger direction, nodes 2 and 11-14
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eventually become aware of A but never adopt it.
Centola and Macy [29] and Siegel [65] make the interesting observation that thresh-
old models for diffusion thus highlight an interesting subtlety in the strength-of-weak-ties
theory. Recall that the strength of weak ties is rooted in the idea that weak social connec-
tions, to people we see infrequently, often form local bridges in a social network. They
therefore provide access to sources of information things like new job opportunities |
that reside in parts of the network we otherwise wouldn’t have access to. The trade-
offs inherent in this picture have been used to motivate some of the reasons why many
social movements tend to build support locally and relatively slowly. Although a world-
spanning system of weak ties in the global friendship network is able to spread awareness
of a joke or an on-line video with remarkable speed, political mobilization moves more
sluggishly, needing to gain momentum within neighborhoods and small communities.
Thresholds provide a possible reason: social movements tend to be inherently risky
undertakings, and hence individuals tend to have higher thresholds for participating; un-
der such conditions, local bridges that connect very different parts of the network are
less useful. Such considerations provide a perspective on other well-known observations
about social movements in the diffusion literature, such as Hedstrom’s findings that such
movements often spread geographically [38] , and McAdam’s conclusion that strong ties,
rather than weak ties, played the more significant role in recruitment to student activism
during Freedom Summer in the 1960s [48] , [49].
2.1.3 Knowledge, Thresholds, and Collective Action
We now switch our discussion to a related topic that integrates network effects at both
the population level and the local network level. We consider situations where coordi-
nation across a large segment of the population is important, and the underlying social
network is serving to transmit information about people’s willingness to participate. Col-
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lective Action and Pluralistic Ignorance. A useful motivating example is the problem of
organizing a protest, uprising, or revolt under a repressive regime [20], [68], [34]. Imag-
ine that you are living in such a society, and are aware of a public demonstration against
the government that is planned for tomorrow. If an enormous number of people show up,
then the government will be seriously weakened, and everyone in society including the
demonstrators will benefit. But if only a few hundred show up, then the demonstrators
will simply all be arrested (or worse), and it would have been better had everyone stayed
home. In such circumstances, what should you do? This is an example of a collective
action problem, where an activity produces benefits only if enough people participate. In
this way, it is reminiscent of our analysis in Chapter 3 of population-level network effects:
as with joining a large-scale demonstration, you only want to buy a fax machine if enough
other people do. The starker setting of the present example highlights a few points, how-
ever. In the case of a fax machine, you can watch the experience of early adopters; you can
read reviews and advertisements; you can canvass a wide array of friends and colleagues
to see what they plan to do. Due to the much stronger negative payoffs associated with
opposing a repressive government, many of these options are closed to you - you can talk
about the idea with a small number of close friends whom you trust, but beyond this
your decision about whether to show up for the demonstration is made difficult by a lack
of knowledge of other people’s willingness to participate, or of their criteria for deciding
whether to participate.
These considerations illustrate some of the reasons why repressive governments work
so hard to limit communication among their citizens. It is possible, for example, that a
large fraction of the population is strong enough in its opposition to be willing to take
extreme measures, but that most of these people believe they’re in a small minority and
hence view opposition as too risky. In this way, a government could survive long after
there is enough strong opposition in principle to get rid of it.
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This phenomenon is known as pluralistic ignorance [55], in which people have wildly
erroneous estimates about the prevalence of certain opinions in the population at large. It
is a principle that applies widely, not just in settings where a central authority is actively
working to restrict information. For example, a survey conducted in the U.S. in 1970 (and
replicated several times in the surrounding years with similar results) showed that while
only a minority of white Americans at that point personally favored racial segregation,
significantly more than 50
A Model for the Effect of Knowledge on Collective Action. Let’s consider how the
structure of the underlying social network can affect the way people make decisions about
collective action, following a model and a set of illustrative examples proposed by Michael
Chwe [20], [68]. Suppose that each person in a social network knows about a potential
upcoming protest against the government, and she has a personal threshold which encodes
her willingness to participate. A threshold of k means, “I will show up for the protest if
I am sure that at least k people in total (including myself) will show up.”
2.1.4 Applications of Social Network Analyzes
We now explore related application of social network analyzes in this section. Klein-
berg , in his recent paper [5] analyzed romantic partnerships and the dispersion of social
ties on Facebook. A crucial task in the analysis of on-line social-networking systems is to
identify important people — those linked by strong social ties — within an individual’s
network neighborhood. In the paper, they investigate this question for a particular cat-
egory of strong ties, those involving spouses or romantic partners. They organize their
analysis around a basic question: given all the connections among a person’s friends, can
one recognize his or her romantic partner from the network structure alone? Using data
from a large sample of Facebook users, they found that this task can be accomplished with
high accuracy, but doing so requires the development of a new measure of tie strength that
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we term ‘dispersion’ — the extent to which two people’s mutual friends are not themselves
well-connected. The results offer methods for identifying types of structurally significant
people in on-line applications, and suggest a potential expansion of existing theories of tie
strength. This issue has also been dealt by [35].
Richardson [23] describe one of the major applications of data mining is in helping
companies determine which potential customers to market to. If the expected profit from
a customer is greater than the cost of marketing to her, the marketing action for that
customer is executed. So far, work in this area has considered only the intrinsic value
of the customer (i.e, the expected profit from sales to her). They propose to model also
the customer’s network value: the expected profit from sales to other customers she may
influence to buy, the customers those may influence, and so on recursively. Instead of
viewing a market as a set of independent entities, they view it as a social network and
model it as a Markov random field. They show the advantages of this approach using a
social network mined from a collaborative filtering database. Marketing that exploits the
network value of customers—also known as viral marketing—can be extremely effective,
but is still a black art. Their work can be viewed as a step towards providing a more solid
foundation for it, taking advantage of the availability of large relevant databases.
Gruhl [37] in his paper studied the dynamics of information propagation in environ-
ments of low-overhead personal publishing, using a large collection of weblogs over time
as our example domain. They characterized and model this collection at two levels. First,
they present a macroscopic characterization of topic propagation through our corpus,
formalizing the notion of long-running "chatter" topics consisting recursively of "spike"
topics generated by outside world events, or more rarely, by resonances within the com-
munity. Second, they present a microscopic characterization of propagation from indi-
vidual to individual, drawing on the theory of infectious diseases to model the flow. They
proposed, validated, and employed an algorithm to induce the underlying propagation
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network from a sequence of posts, and report on the results.
Wasserman [70] focused on relationships among social entities, is used widely in the
social and behavioral sciences, as well as in economics, marketing, and industrial engi-
neering. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications reviewed and discussed
methods for the analysis of social networks with a focus on applications of these methods
to many substantive examples.
2.2 Epidemic Diffusion
The idea of epidemic diffusion is fluently pointed out by author Gladwell in his book
“The Tipping Point” [30]. The idea is simplistic, and the best way to understand the
emergence of fashion trends, the ebb and flow of crime waves. The book argued that the
transformation of unknown books into bestsellers or the rise in risk of teenage smoking
is to think of them as epidemics. Gladwell pointed out that ideas, products, behavior and
messages, all spread just like viruses do.As mentioned in the book by Malcolm Gladwell
[30], few examples of epidemics in actions are rise of Hush Puppies and the fall of New
York’s crime rate. On the basis of all these spread lies underlying patterns.
Leskovec in his paper [45] presents an analysis of a person-to-person recommendation
network, consisting of 4 million people who made 16 million recommendations on half
a million products. They observe the propagation of recommendations and the cascade
sizes, which they explain by a simple stochastic model. They analyze how user behavior
varies within user communities defined by a recommendation network. Product pur-
chases follow a ‘long tail’ where a significant share of purchases belongs to rarely sold
items. They establish how the recommendation network grows over time and how effec-
tive it is from the viewpoint of the sender and receiver of the recommendations. While on
average recommendations are not very effective at inducing purchases and do not spread
very far, they present a model that successfully identifies communities, product, and pric-
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ing categories for which viral marketing seems to be very effective.
Leskovec [46], discuss about cost-effective outbreak detection in networks.- Given
a water distribution network, where should we place sensors to quickly detect contami-
nants? Or, which blogs should we read to avoid missing important stories? These seem-
ingly different problems share common structure: Outbreak detection can be modeled as
selecting nodes (sensor locations, blogs) in a network, in order to detect the spreading of a
virus or information as quickly as possible. They present a general methodology for near
optimal sensor placement in these and related problems. They demonstrate that many
realistic outbreak detection objectives (e.g., detection likelihood, population affected) ex-
hibit the property of "submodularity". They exploit submodularity to develop an effi-
cient algorithm that scales to large problems, achieving near optimal placements, while
being 700 times faster than a simple greedy algorithm. They also derive online bounds on
the quality of the placements obtained by any algorithm. Their algorithms and bounds
also handle cases where nodes (sensor locations, blogs) have different costs. They evaluate
their approach on several large real-world problems,including a model of a water distri-
bution network from the EPA, andreal blog data. The obtained sensor placements are
provably near optimal, providing a constant fraction of the optimal solution. They show
that the approach scales, achieving speedups and savings in storage of several orders of
magnitude. They also show how the approach leads to deeper insights in both applica-
tions, answering multi-criteria trade-off, cost-sensitivity and generalization questions.
Grassberger [36] studied on the critical behavior of the general epidemic process and
dynamical percolation. Scaling laws are formulated for the behavior of a space-dependent
fluctuating general epidemic process near the critical point. Restricted to stationary prop-
erties, these laws describe also the critical behavior of random percolation. Monte Carlo
calculations are used to estimate the critical exponents and the universal shape of the prop-
agating wave, in the case of 2-dimensional space.
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Canonical texts like [3], [39] combines mathematical models with extensive use of
epidemiological and other data. The most widely studied epidemiological models include
the so-called homogeneous models [50], which assume that every individual has equal
contact to others in the population and that the rate of infection is determined by the
density of the infected population. Kephart and White [43] were among the first to
propose epidemiology-based models (the KW model) to analyze the propagation of com-
puter viruses on homogeneous networks. However, Prakash el.at. [57] presents with
an overwhelming evidence that real networks including social networks and routers etc,
follow a power law structure instead. Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani [56] studied viral
propagation for random power-law networks, and showed low or nonexistent epidemic
thresholds, meaning that even an agent with extremely low infectivity could propagate
and persist in the network. They use the “mean-field” approach where all graphs with a
given degree distribution are considered equal. There is no particular reason why all such
graphs should behave similarly in terms of viral propagation. In a recent work, Castellano
and Pastor-Satorras [16] empirically argue that some special family of random power-law
graphs has a non-vanishing threshold under the SIR model in the limit of infinite size, but
provide no theoretical justification.
The population dynamics underlying the diffusion of ideas hold many qualitative sim-
ilarities to those involved in the spread of infections. In spite of much suggestive evidence
this analogy is hardly ever quantified in-useful ways. The standard benefit of modeling
epidemics is the ability to estimate quantitatively population average parameters, such as
interpersonal contact rates, incubation times, duration of infectious periods, etc. In most
cases such quantities generalize naturally to the spread of ideas and provide a simple means
of quantifying sociological and behavioral patterns. In the paper [10], Bettencourt apply
several paradigmatic models of epidemics to empirical data on the advent and spread of
Feynman diagrams through the theoretical physics communities of the USA, Japan, and
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the USSR in the period immediately after World War II. This test case has the advantage
of having been studied historically in great detail, which allows validation of our results.
They estimate the effectiveness of adoption of the idea in the three communities and find
values for parameters reflecting both intentional social organization and long lifetimes for
the idea. These features are probably general characteristics of the spread of ideas, but not
of common epidemics.
Viral marketing has been one of the favorite strategies for marketers to achieve deeper
market penetration. As such, viral marketing like recommendation network based mar-
keting depends on the dynamics of the social influential interaction. The dynamics of the
recommendations in social networks and their impact on the desired outcome in the form
of purchase decisions can be studied as per the theory of local interaction games. In the
paper [9], Banerjee tries to explore the effects of various parameters on such outcomes
and proposes a model for studying these interactions incorporating the game theory based
models and the fuzzy logic.
Viral marketing takes advantage of networks of influence among customers to inex-
pensively achieve large changes in behavior. Richardson’s research [58] seeks to put it
on a firmer footing by mining these networks from data, building probabilistic models of
them, and using these models to choose the best viral marketing plan. Knowledge-sharing
sites, where customers review products and advise each other, are a fertile source for this
type of data mining. Paper extends their previous techniques, achieving a large reduction
in computational cost, and apply them to data from a knowledge-sharing site. They op-
timize the amount of marketing funds spent on each customer, rather than just making
a binary decision on whether to market to him. They take into account the fact that
knowledge of the network is partial, and that gathering that knowledge can itself have a
cost. Their results show the robustness and utility of their approach.
Ugander et.al [69] presented that the concept of contagion has steadily expanded from
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its original grounding in epidemic disease to describe a vast array of processes that spread
across networks, notably social phenomena such as fads, political opinions, the adoption
of new technologies, and financial decisions. Traditional models of social contagion have
been based on physical analogies with biological contagion, in which the probability that
an individual is affected by the contagion grows monotonically with the size of his or her
contact neighborhoodâA˘Tˇthe number of affected individuals with whom he or she is in
contact. Whereas this contact neighborhood hypothesis has formed the underpinning of
essentially all current models, it has been challenging to evaluate it due to the difficulty
in obtaining detailed data on individual network neighborhoods during the course of a
large-scale contagion process. Here, they study this question by analyzing the growth
of Facebook, a rare example of a social process with genuinely global adoption. They
find that the probability of contagion is tightly controlled by the number of connected
components in an individual’s contact neighborhood, rather than by the actual size of
the neighborhood. Surprisingly, once this “structural diversity” is controlled for, the size
of the contact neighborhood is,in fact,generally a negative predictor of contagion. More
broadly, their analysis shows how data at the size and resolution of the Facebook network
make possible the identification of subtle structural signals that go undetected at smaller
scales yet hold pivotal predictive roles for the outcomes of social processes.
Newman [54] mapped the SIR model to a percolation problem on a network and
studied thresholds for multiple competing viruses on special random graphs. Finally,
Chakrabarti et.al. [17] and Ganesh et.al. [28] gave the threshold for the SIS model
on arbitrary undirected networks. However, none of the earlier works focuses on long
term effect of epidemic models for multiple behavior adoption by networks with resource
constraint.
Our work is mindful of this literature but is different in several aspects. Most of the
previous literature focus on diffusion of a single behavior and have not considered long-
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term effects of behavior diffusion. No other work considered the concept of user resource
constraints and thereby does not apply directly to our problem of long term adoption of
behaviors. Works of [11] and [15] discuss the problem of multiple competing influences,
but they also do not include the resource constraints or the effects of individual parameter
variation over time. To our knowledge, the present work is the first investigation of lon-
gitudinal effects of multiple behavior diffusion in a resource constrained social network.
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Chapter 3
DESCRIPTIONS OF EPIDEMIC MODELS OF BEHAVIOR ADOPTION UNDER
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce our behavior adoption models. Table 3.1 and Table
3.2 lists epidemic models and common terminology. In Section 3.2 , we describe our
model of multiple behavior diffusion in a resource constrained network in the most gen-
eral form. In Section 3.3, we point out all the model assumptions. Then, we intro-
duce metrics for performance measurement in Section 3.4 followed by detailed descrip-
tions of epidemic models in Section 3.5 and experimental results from simulations .
Table 3.1: Epidemic behavior models
Shortforms Descriptions
SV S Susceptible-Volatile-Susceptible
SI R Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
SI RS Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible
SV RS Susceptible-Volatile-Recovered-Susceptible
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Table 3.2: Common Terminologies
Symbols Descriptions
G = (V , E) an undirected graph, each node v ∈V of the graph G represents an
individual and an edge e ∈ E between two nodes indicate a social
relationship between the two individuals.
e an edge
k number of behaviors
i each behavior
c i cost of behavior i and 0≤ c i
u i utility of behavior i and u i ≤ 1
rv resource of node v and 0≤ rv ≤ 1
Nv denote the set of neighbors of v in a network.
θiv fixed threshold for behavior i of each individual node v ∈V
l iv local network utility defined as the sum of influence weights–the
social signal–exerted on v by its neighbors who have adopted be-
havior i
p iv payoff for a behavior i is defined as the weighted sum of the intrinsic
utility u i and the local network utility l iv . That is, p
i
v = w u
i +(1−
w)l iv . Where, w denotes the relative weight of the intrinsic utility.
dI infected duration for behavior i
dR recovered duration for behavior i
K S adopted by knapsack
K S dropped by knapsack
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3.2 A Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained
Social Network
We now describe the model for each user, the properties of each behavior and the
behavior adoption process. Conceptually our behavior adoption model can be described
as follows - an individual adopts a new behaviors if the behavior has some value to him
i.e. he has some interest in the behavior (intent), many of her friends have adopted the
behavior (social signal), and she has enough available resource to pursue it (resource).
We represent the social network by an undirected graph G = (V , E). Each node v ∈V
of the graph G represents an individual and an edge e ∈ E between two nodes indicate a
social relationship between the two individuals.
We wish to spread k behaviors in the social network. Each behavior i has an associated
cost ci and a utility ui . The cost refers to the cost of adoption and the utility refers to the
intrinsic utility gained by an individual by adopting this behavior. In a simplification, we
assume that both the cost ci and the utility ui of behavior i are intrinsic to the behavior
and independent of the individual who adopts the behavior. Without loss of generality,
we assume that 0≤ ci , ui ≤ 1.
Individuals are resource constrained: an individual may have limited time, money or
may not possess other material resources to adopt a behavior. Therefore, we assign a fixed
resource r (v) for each individual v ∈V towards adopting behaviors. The resource satis-
fies 0 ≤ r (v) ≤ 1. For example, if we assume that individuals’ resources are independent
and identically distributed then the resource value r (v) can be assumed to be obtained
from a uniformly distributed random variable U (0,1). Let N (v) denote the set of neigh-
bors of v in the network. Then we assume that a neighboring node u asserts a social
influence on node v with weight 1/|N (v)|.
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An individual will adopt a behavior i when she receives a strong social signal, has the
resources to do so and when there is sufficiently high payoff in adopting the behavior.
A behavior is a likely candidate for adoption when the strength of social signal exceeds
a threshold, and the individual has enough resource to adopt the behavior. Figure 3.1
depicts the situation where the candidate behaviors are those for which the high social
signal and resource availability conditions are met. We assume that each individual v has
a different, fixed, threshold θi (v) for each behavior, and that each threshold is obtained
independently from a uniformly distributed random variable U (0,1). The strength of so-
cial signal is measured by li (v) which is defined as the sum of influence weights—the social
signal—exerted on v by its neighbors who have adopted behavior i . The payoff pi (v) for
a behavior i is defined as the weighted sum of the intrinsic utility ui and the local network
utility li (v). That is, pi (v) = w ui + (1−w)li (v). Where, w denotes the relative weight
of the intrinsic utility. Figure 3.2 shows this situation where the payoff is determined by
social signal and intent. An individual adopts only those candidate behaviors that have
high payoff (shown as the intersection between Candidate and Payoff in Figure 3.2). If
there are multiple candidate behaviors, then an individual adopts a subset of candidate
behaviors that maximizes total payoff.
Let us examine the diffusion of behavior over time, to illuminate the key ideas. The
process takes place over discrete epochs 1 . We assume each node is aware of the behaviors
adopted by her neighbors. The individual v first identifies all candidate behaviors. A be-
havior j is a candidate to be adopted if two conditions hold. First the social signal strength
for behavior j must exceed the threshold for that behavior at node v, i.e. l j (v) ≥ θ j (v).
Second, the individual v must have the resources to adopt the behavior, i.e. r (v) ≥ c j .
The first condition is the familiar Linear Threshold (LT) model [41]. Since there are
1Notice that while actions in a network are asynchronous, we can choose an appropriate time granular-
ity for analysis to assume synchronized decision making.
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Candidate
Adoption Resource Availability
Social 
Signal
Intent
Figure 3.1: Sufficient social signal, intent and resource make an individual a candidate
for adoption of a behavior.
multiple behaviors, the individual v chooses a subset of candidate behaviors that maxi-
mizes the total payoff subject to the condition that the sum of the adoption costs of the
behaviors is less than the resource constraint. Let Bc be the set of candidate behaviors for
an individual v. So v adopts a set of behaviors B ⊆ Bc that maximizes∑i∈B pi (v) subject
to the constraint that
∑
i∈B ci ≤ r (v). At every epoch, the individual v evaluates all be-
haviors, including behaviors already adopted, to evaluate payoff. The behavior diffusion
process continues until no additional adoption is possible.
In our diffusion model, we assume that the total resources available r (v) at each node
are known, while the threshold for adoption θ for any behavior is unknown. This as-
sumption is reasonable if when people are willing to make public their available resources
to participate in a set of behaviors. This can arise say in a private, mobile social network
app focused on adoption of healthy behaviors including wellness, healthy eating and ex-
ercise, where individuals join the network to participate in healthy behaviors but each
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Adoption Resource Availability
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Signal
Intent
Payoff
Figure 3.2: Payoff for adopting a behavior comes from an individual’s intent and social
signal.
individual is resource limited. An individual may declare that she has only one hour to
spend on exercise each week, but would like to be nudged to participate in a health-related
activity.
Figure 3.3 shows an illustration of the spread of behaviors with a four node net-
work where three different behaviors - recycling, using public transport and eating lo-
cally grown food denoted by behaviors 1, 2 and 3 respectively. At time step 0 the state of
the network is shown in 3.4. At this time step, for v, the social signal of eating locally
grown food is weak. So v considers only recycling and using public transport for adop-
tion. After maximizing payoff subject to the resource constraint, v adopts only recycling.
Although public transport has strong social signal, v cannot adopt that behavior because
it does not have enough resource. Notice that the payoff for recycling is higher than that
of public transport, though the intrinsic utility of recycling was lower than that of public
transport.
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Cost = 0.2 Cost = 0.5 Cost = 0.7
Resource = 0.6
Thresholds – 
0.1, 0.4, 0.6
Figure 3.3: The three behaviors - (1) recycling, (2) using public transport, and (3) eating
organic food with respective costs as well as the network is shown. The intrinsic utility of
the behaviors are same as the cost. So c1 = u1 = 0.2, c2 = u2 = 0.5, c3 = u3 = 0.7. Resource
of the node v, r (v) = 0.6, and the thresholds are - θ1(v) = 0.1, θ2(v) = 0.4, θ3 = 0.6.
3.3 Model Assumptions
We assume several conditions while performing all the experiments in this chapter.
• We assume number of nodes in the network to be constant over time.
• We assume individuals’ resources availability , cost of performing a behavior , adop-
tion threshold of a behavior and global influence are constant over the period of
time.
• We assume the number of behavior/s is constant over time.
• While performing all the simulations , we assume that the time progresses with
every ticks. Time tick is calculated by each discrete epochs.
• Every individuals are time bounded, either by the infected duration dI or the recov-
ery duration dR.
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Local influence:
Recycling      = 1.0;
Public trans.  = 0.66;
Organic food = 0.33
Figure 3.4: This is the network at time step 0. All three of the neighbors of v have
adopted recycling, two of them have adopted public transport, and only one of them is
eating organic food. v has not adopted any behavior yet. The local influences for the
three behaviors are as follows - l1(v) = 1.0, l2(v) = 0.66, l3(v) = 0.33.
Local influence for 
organic food is weak
Figure 3.5: Local influence for organic food is less than the threshold, i.e l3(v) < θ3(v).
So v will not consider organic food for adoption.
• We assume every individuals are in Susceptible (S) state from the very first time
stamp.
• Another important assumption is that all resources rv , behavior cost c i , behavior
utility u i , infected duration dI and recovered duration dR are assigned in the very
beginning and remains unchanged over time.
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Payoff for 
recycling > public trans.
Insufficient resource to 
adopt both behaviors
Figure 3.6: c1 + c2 > r (v), so v’s resource is insufficient for adopting both recycling and
public transport. Payoff for recycling, p1(v) = 0.5× 0.2 + 0.5× 1.0 = 0.6, and public
transport, p2(v) = 0.5× 0.5+ 0.5× 0.66 = 0.58 (w = 0.5). For v the payoff for recycling
is higher than the payoff for using public transport though the intrinsic utility of public
transport is higher than that of recycling. So v will adopt recycling at the end of time step
1.
3.4 Measurement of the Diffusion
We measure the effectiveness of the diffusion process with three metrics: total partici-
pation, total adoption and resource utilization. Since the behavior adoption is a stochastic
process, we compute the expected value of each metric through simulation.
3.4.1 Total Participation
This metric counts the the expected number of individuals who have adopted at least
one behavior (i.e. become active) during the process. For example, one goal for an ad-
vertiser of a product may be to maximize the total number of unique adoptees. Exact
computation of this metric is shown to be #P-hard [19].
3.4.2 Total Adoption
In contrast to total participation, we need to keep track of the total number of adop-
tions of any behavior during the diffusion process. This metric counts the expected num-
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ber of adoptions over all the behaviors. Notice that since an individual can adopt more
than one behavior, total adoption cannot be less than the total participation. For the
single behavior adoption problem, these two metrics will have the same value.
3.4.3 Resource Utilization
This metric captures the efficiency of the network to adopt costly behaviors. Not all
resources available in a social network may be used for behavior adoption. This is because
individuals have variable resources, and they may be unable to adopt the subset of behav-
iors that fully takes advantage of their desire to participate because of two reasons. First,
they may have many more resources than needed to adopt the behavior. Second, if their
friends have limited resources, then the social signals that they receive will be about adopt-
ing low-cost resources, and hence a particular individual may never see costly behaviors
in their social circle that they could potentially adopt. Let us assume that a node v with
resource rv has adopted one or more behaviors. Let sv be the amount of resource that v
has used to adopt those behaviors, where s ≤ rv . Therefore, the individual has rv − sv
amount of his resource remaining unused. Resource utilization is the expected value of
the ratio
∑
v∈V sv/
∑
v∈V rv i.e. the ratio of total utilized resource to the total amount of
available resource of all the individuals in the social network.
3.5 SVS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained Network
For the SV S (Susceptible-Volatile-Susceptible) model , we shall assume that the adop-
tion of behaviors is “Sticky”, that is, once a node adopts a behavior it never gets rid of that.
This simplification is also known as progressive behavior adoption [41]. Notice that once
a node adopts a behavior its resource to adopt other behaviors decreases. The “Sticky"
model is named as SV S (Susceptible-Volatile-Susceptible) . Figure 3.5 shows the state-
diagram of SV S model. Every individual remains in susceptible state (S ) , where she is
36
prone to adopt a behavior and remains until the local signal l iv of behavior i for node v
is greater than the adoption threshold θiv . An individual also remains in the Susceptible
state (S ) when she is not picked by knapsack K S , indicating that the payoff p i is low.
Once the required conditions are met, node v adopts behavior i and moves to the volatile(
V ) state. The reason of naming the state to be volatile, because any competitive behavior
with higher payoff can knock out the existing behavior . Note that the model is behavior
dependent and individual independent. An individual adopts a behavior and continues to
stay in V state when the behavior is chosen by knapsack.
S V
(l iv ≥ θiv)∧KS
KS
KS(l iv <θ
i
v)∨KS
Figure 3.7: State-Diagram for SV S model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt a behavior. An individual remains in the susceptible state if
local utility l iv of behavior i for node v is lower than the threshold θ
i
v for behavior i , or
dropped in knapsack KS. Once the required conditions are met, node v adopts behavior
i and moves to the volatile (V ) state.
3.5.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SVS
We perform the following simulation setup to execute all our experiments. There are
fixed parameters and controlling parameter. Fixed parameters are the number of nodes
as 100 , number of seeds as 10 . We are considering single behavior propagation with
behavior cost as 0.5 and behavior utility as 0.5. We use “ Hill Climbing “ algorithm for
the seed selection and perform uniform distribution of seeds across the network. Note
that the resources of individuals, adoption threshold and adoption cost of the behavior
remains constant across the network over time. For the experiment mention in Figure
3.8 , the adopted duration is set as 2. This experiment is a comparative study of SV S
37
epidemic model across time , over three different network topologies such as preferential
attachment , small-world and complete regular graph.
Interestingly , in Figure 3.8 we observe a decrease in resource utilization in case of
network topologies like smallworld and regular complete graph when compared with
preferential attachment. Our explanation is that with increase of neighbors , an individual
needs to have higher number of neighbors adopting the behavior to influence her.
3.6 SIR Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained Network
In this thesis, we examine the connection between epidemic models and the behavior
adoption process. In classical SI R (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model, an infected
individual recovers after a period of time. In our model , we represent the period of infec-
tion as dI . This concept is similar to the idea presented by [17] . The recovered state (R) is
synonymous to dropping the behavior for an indefinite time period. Ugander et. al. [69]
in his paper also showed the concept of contagion has steadily expanded from its original
grounding in epidemic disease to describe a vast array of processes that spread across net-
works. The key difference of our model with these previous works is the idea of multiple
behavior adoption under limited resources. As shown in Figure 3.6 , an individual will
remain in S state till her local social signal l iv is not greater than her behavior threshold θ
i
v
or may not be selected in knapsack. As we are considering multiple behavior adoption,
we also look into the payoff pi factor to adopt a behavior. Only if the pi of a behavior i
is greater than threshold θiv , then the individual adopts the behavior. Once a behavior is
adopted , she is consider to be in infected state(I ) and remains in the state for dI period of
time.
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S I R
(l iv ≥ θiv)∧KS(l iv <θiv)∨KS
dI times
∞
Figure 3.9: State-Diagram for SI R Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt a behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i and transforms
to infected I state if local utility l iv of behavior i for node v is greater than the threshold θ
i
v
for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected
duration) times. After dI period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains
there for an infinite amount of time.
3.6.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SIR
We setup the experiment in the following manner. There are fixed parameters and
varying parameter. Fixed parameters are the number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as
10 . We are considering single behavior propagation with behavior cost as 0.5 and behav-
ior utility as 0.5. We use “ Hill Climbing “ algorithm for the seed selection and perform
uniform distribution of seeds across the network. Note that the resources of individu-
als, adoption threshold and adoption cost of the behavior remains constant across the
network over time. For the experiment mention in Figure 3.10 , the adopted duration
is taken as ‘two‘ time-stamp. This experiment is a comparative study of SI R epidemic
model across time , over three different network topologies such as preferential attach-
ment , small-world and complete regular graph.
In Figure 3.10 , we observe that the behavior propagation in the system dies down
quickly when we perform the experiment on PA network. However, behavior propa-
gation continues for a longer period of time in case of smallworld and complete regular
graph. Dependency of behavior adoption on the number of neighbors of an individual
provides a possible explanation. In smallworld and regular complete graph , behaviors
propagate for a longer period due to higher regularity in number of neighbors of an indi-
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vidual. In the case of PA network, we choose seeds which can impart the highest influence
which eventually are some of the highest degree nodes. Hence, seed nodes propagates the
behavior to peripheral nodes, and peripheral nodes are not powerful enough to impose
influence on any other higher degree nodes which leading to the extinction of behavior
propagation.
3.7 SIRS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained Network
This model is an extension of the SI R model as we will see from its construction.
S→ I → R→ S
The only difference is that it allows individuals in recovered state R to be free of infection
and rejoin the susceptible state S after dR recovered duration.
In Figure 3.7 , we illustrate SI RS model using a state diagram. We assume every
individuals are in susceptible S state till the social signal l iv is greater than the threshold
θiv and payoff p
i is high enough to get adopted by knapsack. Once an individual adopts a
behavior, she moves to infected state I and continues till the infected duration dI is over.
Then an individual moves to recovered state R where she remains for dR duration. This
model can be explained with an example. An individual adopts jogging and performs it
for two weeks , then she sprained her leg and failed to perform the behavior for the next
week. At the end of her recovery time , she is again susceptible to continue with jogging
if she has enough time and motivation to perform it.
3.7.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SIRS
We setup the experiment in the following manner. There are fixed parameters and
varying parameter. Fixed parameters are the number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as
10 . We are considering single behavior propagation with behavior cost as 0.5 and behav-
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S I R
(l iv ≥ θiv)∧KS(l iv <θiv)∨KS
dI times
dRtimes
Figure 3.11: State-Diagram for SI RS Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i and transforms
to infected I state if local utility l iv of behavior i for node v is greater than the threshold θ
i
v
for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected
duration) times. After dI period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains
there for dR (recovered duration) period of time before converting to susceptible state.
ior utility as 0.5. We use “ Hill Climbing “ algorithm for the seed selection and perform
uniform distribution of seeds across the network. Note that the resources of individu-
als, adoption threshold and adoption cost of the behavior remains constant across the
network over time. For the experiment mention in Figure 3.12 , the adopted duration
is taken as ‘two‘ time-stamp. This experiment is a comparative study of SI RS epidemic
model across time , over three different network topologies such as preferential attach-
ment , small-world and complete regular graph.
An interesting insight from this experiment is, in contrary of the classical SI RS model
where behavior propagation continues for infinite amount of time. Here we observe that
propagation is network dependent. While performing the experiment on a more realistic
network like preferential attachment, behavior adoption dies down after a period of time.
3.8 SVRS Model of Multiple Behavior Diffusion in a Resource Constrained Network
This SV RS (Susceptible-Volatile-Recovered-Susceptible) model is a variant of SI RS
model.
S→V → R→ S
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The major difference is, this model allows multiple behavior adoptions and behavior
switches over time. For example, an individual starts jogging with her friends, but after
a month she bought a bike and can start biking instead. In this example, there is a behav-
ior switch taking place. In order to incorporate that individuals tend to adopt multiple
behaviors and switching of behaviors , we introduced the volatile state V .
In Figure 3.8 , we explained SV RS model using a state diagram. We assume every
individuals are in susceptible S state till the social signal l iv is greater than the threshold
θiv and payoff p
i is high enough to get adopted by knapsack. Once an individual adopts a
behavior, she moves to volatile state V . In volatile state she can either continue perform-
ing the behavior for dI period of time , else she can adopt a new behavior which gives
her higher payoff p i . If she adopts a behavior and performs it for dI period of time, she
finishes performing the behavior and moves to the recovered state. For example, if an
individual wants to write blog on a topic and she spends two days to perform that. Then
she gets done with bloging and becomes susceptible to perform other activities. Since ,
after completion of performing a behavior an individual drops the behavior, we kept a
recovered state in our model. The recovery duration can negligible and one can get sus-
ceptible to other behavior/s immediately .The main motivation behind developing this
model is to capture the periodic nature of human behavior adoption in everyday life.
3.8.1 Simulation Results and Discussion of SVRS
We setup the experiment in the following manner. There are fixed parameters and
varying parameter. Fixed parameters are the number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as
10 . We are considering single behavior propagation with behavior cost as 0.5 and behav-
ior utility as 0.5. We use “ Hill Climbing “ algorithm for the seed selection and perform
uniform distribution of seeds across the network. Note that the resources of individuals,
adoption threshold and adoption cost of the behavior remains constant across the net-
45
S V R
(l iv ≥ θiv)∧KS(l iv <θiv)∨KS
dI times∨KS
dRtimes
Figure 3.13: State-Diagram for SV RS Model: where S is the susceptible state where an
individual is prone to adopt behavior. An individual adopts a behavior i and transforms
to infected I state if local utility V of behavior i for node v is greater than the threshold θiv
for behavior i and get chosen in knapsack K S. Node v remains in I state for dI (infected
duration) times. After dI period of time, node v moves to R (recovered) state and remains
there for dR (recovered duration) period of time before converting to susceptible state.
work over time. For the experiment mention in Figure 3.14 , the adopted duration is
taken as ‘two‘ time-stamp. This experiment is a comparative study of SV RS epidemic
model across time , over three different network topologies such as preferential attach-
ment [14] , small-world [71], [51] and complete regular graph.
Referring to Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.14, the difference between SIRS model and
SVRS model is that there is a negligible recovery time . Hence even when the node is
infected it is participating in knapsack. Due to negligible recovery time in the case of PA
network, we inspected that the seed node is influencing peripheral nodes. Also,the be-
havior propagates back from the peripheral nodes to the seed nodes before the peripheral
nodes recover. Therefore we find a nice periodic graph as a result.
3.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced all our epidemic models and discussed about the simula-
tion results. We assume that the parameters like resource availability , adoption threshold
, adoption cost and global influence are constant. Understanding the parameters variation
over time is an interesting direction to explore. Chapter 5, we introduce those models.
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Chapter 4
VARYING PARAMETERS OVER TIME
In this chapter, we formulate four different questions to better understand how behav-
ior propagates in a resource constraint social network. In each section we model variation
of different parameter over time and present results with discussions. In Section 4.1 , we
discuss about resource availability variation over time. In Section 4.2 , we introduce adop-
tion threshold variation over time. In Section 4.3, we model the variation of adoption
cost over time. In Section 4.4 , we model the variation of global influence over time.
In Section 4.5 , we compare all the parameter variations with combination of parameter
variations over time.
4.1 How varying resource availability of an individual can shape the
behavior diffusion over time?
In this section, we model weekly variation in availability of resources.Briefly, the idea
is, an individual may not have equal resources available every day of a week. For example,
an individual can have four hours for social service on the weekends but no time during
the weekdays. We introduce two variants of resource availability in this chapter. In our
model, we are representing the resource available with an individual v at time stamp t as
rv(t ).
4.1.0.1 Weekend Peaks
The main idea behind weekend peaks is that most of the population is having more
resource during the same time. For example, most of the individuals are having more
resources during their weekends than weekdays.
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4.1.0.2 Random Peaks
In “Random Peaks" , we build the model in such a way that individuals can have higher
resource on any two consecutive days of the week. For example, in a community, if one
individual is having more time during weekends, another individual may have more time
on Wednesdays and Thursdays.
4.1.1 Description of Model Resource Availability Variation
We want to model the variation of available resources for an individual over the dif-
ferent days of a week. Generally one can assume that more resource will be available for
pursuing behaviors over the weekend than the week days. We want our model of resource
variation to satisfy the following three conditions -
1. Experimenter can specify the fraction of average total weekly resource which will be
available over the weekends. Let α be the fraction of average total weekly resource
that is available on average over the weekends for the individuals. If we assign indi-
vidual resources uniformly at random from [0,1] for all the seven days of the week,
then the value of α will be 2/7, i.e. 28.57% of average total weekly resource will be
available over the weekends.
2. The average total weekly resource should be 3.5. Note that this would be the average
total weekly resource if we assign individual resource uniformly at random from
[0,1] for all the seven day (the daily average will be 0.5, so the weekly average will
be 0.5×7 = 3.5). This will also be the seven day average for the single resource base
case. We want to keep the average resource value fixed at 3.5, because we want to
compare the resource variation scenario with the no variation model.
3. The average resource of the population for any day of the week must be at most 1.0.
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4.1.1.1 Naive Attempt:
Let the average total weekly resource be x. So x(1− α) = 2.5. Let β× 0.5 be the
average weekend resource. So xα=β, i.e. β= α1−α .2.5.
So we will first assign a number chosen uniformly at random from [0,1] as the re-
source value for each of the seven days of the week. Then we will multiply the weekend
resources byβ. But this can make the weekend resource more than 1. So we will normal-
ize the daily resources, i.e. divide the resource of each day by the sum of the total weekly
resource. Although this approach satisfies condition 1 and 3, it does not satisfy condition
2 mentioned above. In fact the total weekly resource will be exactly 1.0 in this approach,
which is not acceptable. The network will become much poorer than in the no variation
model.
4.1.1.2 A Better Approach:
If we let α take any arbitrary value then it is not possible to satisfy condition 2. Pre-
cisely, α need to satisfy the following condition - 3.5α ≤ 2, i.e. α ≤ 0.57. So we let the
experimenter vary the value of α from 29% to 57%.
Let w¯ be the average weekday resource. So we know that 5w¯ = 3.5(1− α), i.e. w¯ =
3.5(1−α)
5 .
For 0.29 ≤ α ≤ 0.57, w¯ < 0.5. So for the 5 weekdays we assign the resource value
uniformly at random from [0,2w¯]. The average weekend resource will be 3.5α2 > 0.5. So
we assign the two weekend resources uniformly at random from [3.5w¯ − 1,1].
4.1.2 Fixing the values of α for resource availability variation
As mentioned in the previous section, we are calculating the alpha value by performing
exhaustive experiments and details of these experiments are given in Appendix
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4.1.3 Simulation Setup for Varying Resource Availability Over Time
In this section, we are mentioning all the common simulation setups which we fol-
low to obtain our results. We perform experiments and concluded combination of PA
network and SVRS epidemic model is the best combination . Hence, all results follows
with this combination. We also perform extensive experiments on other topologies and
network , they are mentioned in the Appendix. There are few fixed parameters and few
varying parameters. Fixed Parameters are number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds 10 ,
number of behavior 1 , cost of behavior 0.5 , utility 0.5 , infected duration 5 , recovered
duration 2 , seed selection algo = hill climbing , seed distribution = uniform , Thresh-
old average over 1000 runs . Varying Parameters : Epidemic Duration Model is SVRS,
Network Topology as PA. We are comparing between “Weekend Peaks“ and “Random
Peaks“.
4.1.4 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior
In this section, we present the simulation results from single behavior followed by
discussions. Note that , all fixed parameters and controlled parameter used during each
experiments are mentioned in details with each result.
Observations for Figure 4.1
• Main difference between "Weekend Peaks" and "Random Peaks" model is the max-
imum utilization. Maximum utilization when resources are synchronized is 0.46
whereas maximum utilization when resource variation is not synchronized is 0.23.
• Second, we observe a periodic nature for the "Weekend Peaks" resource variation.
During weekends or during the higher resource timestamps, we observe a rise in
resource utilization. Note that cost of behavior is 0.5 and during weekdays no node
has resource as 0.5, hence during weekdays no adoption is taking place. We also
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observe for "Random Peaks" model utilization never reaches zero. The reason is,
unlike "Weekend Peaks" there are nodes having 0.5 or more resources even during
weekdays and hence individuals continues to perform the behavior.
4.2 What happens when adoption threshold of each individual vary over time?
In this section, we model variation of the individuals’ intent over time. In case of
classical Linear Threshold model the threshold remains constant through out the behav-
ior adoption. In our model adoption threshold varies with time. According to Linear
Threshold model, an individual will only adopt a behavior when the local social signal is
high. For example, you want to learn swimming but the swimming club is off the route
from home to office. After few months, your office got sifted near the swimming club
location, then it becomes more convenient for you to enroll.
In the“varying adoption threshold“ model , we represent the change in adoption thresh-
old over time. The process takes place over discrete epochs 1 . We assume that each node
is aware of the behaviors adopted in the network. The individual v first identifies all can-
didate behaviors. A behavior i is a candidate to be adopted if two conditions hold true.
First, the individual v must have the resources to adopt the behavior, i.e rv ≥ c i . Second,
the social signal strength for behavior i must exceed the threshold for that behavior at
node v, i.e l iv ≥ θiv . Note that, all nodes are assigned a threshold in the very beginning
θiv(ze r o). This is similar to an individual initially having an adoption threshold who can
get influenced over time. The second condition is similar to Linear Threshold (LT) model.
Here, we are representing a variant of LT model, where adoption threshold for a behavior
of a node θiv changes over time. The change in adoption threshold depends on the knowl-
edge of global adoption of behavior i in the network. We model the threshold variation
1Notice that while actions in a network are asynchronous, we can choose an appropriate time granular-
ity for analysis to assume synchronized decision making.
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such that an uniformly random fraction of the population will have a positive effect to
global adoption of the behavior whereas the rest of the population will have a negative
effect. For example, if an individual learns about the increasing global adoption of or-
ganic food, she can be affected positively and her adoption threshold may get reduced.
On the other hand, an individual can have a negative effect, which leads to increase in her
adoption threshold.
4.2.1 Mathematical Model for Varying Threshold Over Time
θiv(t ) = θ
i
0− x i (t ) ∗α (4.1)
θiv(t ) = θ
i
0 + x
i (t ) ∗α (4.2)
where θiv(t ) =final threshold for behavior i , node v at time t ,
θi0 =initial threshold at t0 ,
α=maximum threshold drop or gain,
xi = ni/N .
Hence, when x i = 0, then θiv(t ) = θ
i
0 and when x
i = 1, then θiv(t ) = θ
i
0 +α , which is
the stable threshold θis .
As mentioned in the previous section, we are calculating the alpha and the ratio of
individuals who are more susceptible by performing exhaustive experiments which are
mentioned in Appendix A on page 84.
4.2.2 Simulation Setup for adoption threshold variation over time
We perform all our experiments under the following conditions. There are two pa-
rameters, we fixed few parameters like Number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as 10 ,
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number of behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as 0.5 , behavior utility 0.5 , infected duration
as 2 , recovered duration 1 , seed selection algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g , seed distribution as
uni f o r m. We perform all experiments by averaging 1000 threshold runs. The varying
parameters are “Threshold variation “ and “No Threshold Variation“. Also we assign
70% of the population to have positive effect on threshold variation and 30% population
will have negative effect. We assign threshold drop or gain to 0.2. Both the threshold
drop/gain and the percentage of population having positive and negative effects are as-
signed after extensive experimental study and careful observation. All results are given in
the Appendix.
4.2.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior
In this section, we present the simulation results from single behavior followed by
discussion on the results. Note , all fixed parameters and controlled parameter used during
each experiments are mentioned in details with every result.
For our first experiment, we randomly select half of the nodes to have positive effect to
threshold variation for behavior i and the rest will have negative effects.This experiment
is comparing resource utilization of "Threshold Variation on" i.e the threshold variation
over time and "Threshold Variation off" i.e having a fixed threshold for a single run. Fig-
ure 4.5, gives us an interesting insight and we observe with "Threshold Variation on",
we can have 7 - 60 % raise in resource utilization. On careful observation, we see the
resource utilization increase is due the combination of both positive and negative effect.
In the first epoch, we are selecting high degree nodes as seeds, and with progression of
time, behavior i is propagating to peripheral nodes. In case of "Threshold Variation off",
peripheral nodes are unable to influence the seed node leading to decrease in behavior
adoption whereas interestingly for "Threshold Variation on" variant, there are few seed
nodes having a negative effect and adoption threshold is getting decreased. Due to a de-
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crease in threshold , peripheral nodes are able to influence the seed nodes and bring an
increase in resource utilization.
4.3 Can change in the behavior adoption cost affects behavior distribution
in the long term?
This Section starts with the mathematical model and graphical representation on how
adoption cost varies with time. Followed by initial experimental results and discussions.
Our main motivation is to examine What happens when adoption cost varies over time?.
In order to model the cost variation, we take an intuitive approach. We are considering
every behavior i is associated with a cost c i at time ze r o. For example, an individual starts
with biking, initially there is a learning curve and time to learn how to bike is the cost
in our model. As time progresses, if an individual carries on with biking her proficiency
increases and eventually cost decreases. We model this decrease as an exponential decrease
and it happens when the node is in the infected state.
4.3.1 Mathematical Model for Varying Adoption Cost Over Time
c i (t ) = c i +α ∗ e−c t (4.3)
where c i = adoption cost of of behavior i , exponentially decreasing ,
c i = behavior dependent constant ,
α =max cost drop ,
c t = cumulative infected time.
4.3.2 Simulation setup for varying adoption cost over time
We perform all our experiments under the following conditions. There are two pa-
rameters, we fixed few parameters like Number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as 10 ,
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number of behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as 0.5 , behavior utility 0.5 , infected duration
as 2 , recovered duration 1 , seed selection algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g , seed distribution as
uni f o r m. We perform all experiments by averaging 1000 threshold runs. The varying
parameters are “Cost variation “ and “No Cost Variation“. We assign constant as 10 and
the cost variation drop as 0.2. Both the adoption cost drop and the constant are assigned
after extensive experimental study and careful observation. All results are given in the
Appendix.
4.3.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior
From figure 4.6, we observe the following insights.
• SVS Duration Model :In case of Regular complete graph, we saw the highest increase
in adoption 25.16% with respect to 11% in case of PA and 10.76% for small world.
It shows that reduction of adoption cost can give more boosts to highly connected
individuals.
• SIRS Duration Model: An interesting conclusion is when the recovery duration
comes into play, in both PA and complete regular graph we observed a 12% increase
in adoption.
• SVRS Duration Model: Similar to SIRS model, there is an overall 12% increase in
adoption in SVRS epidemic model.
4.4 How does the resource utilization change with varying global influence over time?
In this thesis, in all other models, we have taken local influence into account. How-
ever, global knowledge plays a big role in behavior adoption that we learn from history of
newspapers. Hence , we are interested to examine the effects of global influence variation
over time on behavior adoption.
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4.4.1 Mathematical Model of Varying Global Influence
ωi = min(1, l iv + xi ) (4.4)
ωi = max(0, l iv − xi ) (4.5)
whereωi = total influence ,
łiv =local influence ,
xi = ni/N , global influence .
4.4.2 Simulation setup for global influence variation over time
We perform all our experiments under the following conditions. There are two pa-
rameters, we fixed few parameters like Number of nodes as 100 , number of seeds as 10 ,
number of behavior as 1 , cost of behavior as 0.5 , behavior utility 0.5 , infected duration
as 2 , recovered duration 1 , seed selection algo as hi l l c l i mb i n g , seed distribution as
uni f o r m. We perform all experiments by averaging 1000 threshold runs. The varying
parameters are “Global Influence Variation “ and “No Global Influence Variation“. We
assign ratio of population as 70 : 30, i.e 70 % of the population will have positive effect
to the variation of global influence over time whereas , 30 % of the population will have
negative effect of the global influence. This ratio of population is assigned after extensive
experimental study and careful observations. All results are given in the Appendix.
4.4.3 Simulation Results and Discussions for Single Behavior
In this section, we present the simulation results for single behavior adoption followed
by discussion on the results. Note that all fixed parameters and controlled parameters used
during each experiments are mentioned in detail with each result.
63
0
.3
8
0
.2
8
0
.0
7
0
.1
9
0
.2
0
0
.0
6
0
.1
8
0
.2
0
0
.2
0
0
.1
5
0
.2
0
0
.2
0
0
.1
5
0
.0
6
0
.1
8
0
.0
6
0
.1
8
0
.2
0
0
.2
0
0
.1
0
0
.3
6
0
.4
1
0
.4
2
0
.3
3
0
.1
3
0
.2
7
0
.3
0
0
.3
1
0
.2
5
0
.1
2
0
.2
5
0
.2
8
0
.2
9
0
.2
3
0
.1
2
0
.2
5
0
.2
8
0
.2
9
0
.2
3
0
.1
2
0
.2
5
0
.2
8
0
.2
9
0
.2
3
0
.1
2
0
.2
5
0
.2
8
0
.2
9
0
.2
3
0
.1
2
0
.0
0
0
.2
0
0
.4
0
0
.6
0
0
.8
0
1.
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
2
8
2
9
3
0
3
1
Resource Utilization
T
im
e
 S
ta
m
p
N
o
 G
lo
b
a
l 
In
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 V
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
ra
ti
o
 =
 0
.7
Fi
gu
re
4.
7:
W
e
pe
rf
or
m
al
lo
ur
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
un
de
rt
he
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nd
iti
on
s.
T
he
re
ar
e
tw
o
pa
ra
m
et
er
s,
w
e
fix
ed
fe
w
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
lik
e
N
um
be
r
of
no
de
s
as
10
0
,n
um
be
r
of
se
ed
s
as
10
,n
um
be
r
of
be
ha
vi
or
as
1
,c
os
to
fb
eh
av
io
r
as
0.
5
,b
eh
av
io
r
ut
ili
ty
0.
5
,
in
fe
ct
ed
du
ra
tio
n
as
2
,r
ec
ov
er
ed
du
ra
tio
n
1
,s
ee
d
se
le
ct
io
n
al
go
as
hi
ll
cl
im
b
in
g
,s
ee
d
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
as
un
if
or
m
.W
ep
er
fo
rm
al
le
xp
er
im
en
ts
by
av
er
ag
in
g
10
00
th
re
sh
ol
d
ru
ns
.
T
he
va
ry
in
g
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
ar
e
“G
lo
ba
lI
nfl
ue
nc
e
V
ar
ia
tio
n
“
an
d
“N
o
G
lo
ba
l
In
flu
en
ce
V
ar
ia
tio
n“
.W
e
as
si
gn
ra
tio
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
as
70
:3
0,
i.e
70
%
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
w
ill
ha
ve
po
si
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct
to
th
e
va
ri
at
io
n
of
gl
ob
al
in
flu
en
ce
ov
er
tim
e
w
he
re
as
,3
0
%
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
w
ill
ha
ve
ne
ga
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct
of
th
e
gl
ob
al
in
flu
en
ce
.
T
hi
s
ra
tio
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
is
as
si
gn
ed
af
te
r
ex
te
ns
iv
e
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
ls
tu
dy
an
d
ca
re
fu
lo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
.A
ll
re
su
lts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x
64
Figure 4.7 , shows the experimental results for varying global influence over time.
In all the experimental results, we observe a drop in resource utilization. Reason for
the drop in utilization is the effect of knowledge about adoption in global population.
Note that the global influence is behavior dependent. The additional knowledge of the
global behavior adoption is diluting the weight of social signal exerted by neighbors. For
example , 50 % of neighbors of node v adopted behavior j , then local influence is 0.5
whereas only 20 % of the global population has adopted the behavior j . If we take the
threshold θ jv of behavior j of node v is 0.5, with knowledge of only local adoption v
will end up adopting behavior j . After addition of the global influence knowledge, the
combined weight is less than the threshold of v. Therefore as a result of this experiment,
we can see global influence is acting as a diluting factor and reducing resource utilization.
We find there is a 21 % - 88% increase in behavior lifespan in the network. This is caused
by participation of peripheral nodes having no or negligible local influence. We found
that there are nodes having low threshold and enough resource for behavior adoption
but do not have any knowledge of the presence of the behavior j in the network. By
introducing the idea of global awareness, these nodes are getting activated, and behavior
j remains in the network for a longer period of time.
4.5 What happens when combinations of parameters varies over time?
In this section , we examine the scenarios where multiple assumption parameters are
varying over time. This not only is more realistic , but also provides us with insights
which are comparable.
In this section we perform several parameter combination variation. We provide the
experimental sequence and all parameter combination results in Appendix.In figure A.11
, we present the comparative study of these combinations. We use short forms to repre-
sent the combinations due to lack of graphical space. There “BM” is the base model where
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no variation of parameters are taking place. Starting from right hand side, we look into
“T” , where adoption threshold is varying over time. Then “C” is the adoption cost vari-
ation . We represent variation of resource availability by “R”. “GI” is the short form of
global influence variation over time. Then combinations like “T + C ” is the case where
both threshold and cost are varying with time. “C + R ” is another scenario where both
adoption cost and the resource availability varies. We present variation of cost , resource
availability and threshold by “C+R+T”. In the above mentioned experiments we only
consider local social signal on an individual , now we present the additive effect of global
influence variation in the case of “ C+R+T+GI”. Note that all the constant are already
fixed in previous sections. Here we are concentrating on combinational effects.
4.5.1 Simulation Results and Discussions
In figure 4.8 , we represent all the combination variations using a boxplot data visual-
ization [40] , [62]. In descriptive statistics, a box plot or boxplot is a convenient way of
graphically depicting groups of numerical data through their quartiles. Outliers are plot-
ted as individual points. Box plots display differences between populations without mak-
ing any assumptions of the underlying statistical distribution: they are non-parametric.
The spacings between the different parts of the box help indicate the degree of dispersion
(spread) and skewness in the data, and identify outliers. In addition to the points them-
selves, they allow one to visually estimate various L-estimators, notably the interquartile
range, midhinge, range, mid-range, and trimean. We are representing our longitudinal
distributions and in Figure 4.8 , there are few interesting intuitive observations.
• We observe adoption cost variation gives us a statistically significant increase in
resource utilization.
• Similarly combination of threshold and cost variation of a behavior adoption gives
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us a statistically significant increase in resource utilization.
• Interestingly , when resource availability variation comes into play , we observe an
increase in range of resources among individuals but the maximum resource utiliza-
tion is not getting benefited.
• While comparing to no variation model , which we are representing as “BM” , ad-
ditive effect of global influence variation gives us an increase in resource utilization
as well as extends the range of resource variation among individuals.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Introduction
In conclusion, we shall first summarize the work presented in this thesis, along the
lines of the five questions that have been tackled here. They are behavior duration mod-
els, varying adoption cost, varying adoption threshold, varying resource availability and
varying global influence. Then, in section 5.3, we shall present some possible improve-
ments to the models used in this work and in section 5.4, we shall present a few potential
areas of future research.
5.2 Research Summary
We now present a synopsis of the work done in this thesis by first summarizing our
approach to epidemic models.
5.2.1 Behavior Duration Models
The thesis developed a novel framework for including epidemic models and costly
behavior diffusion in a social network. We focused on social network having limited
resource and focused our investigation on four epidemic models. The first two models are
SIR (Susceptible - Infected - Recovered) and SIRS (Susceptible - Infected - Recovered - Susceptible)
and the last two are SVS (Susceptible - Volatile - Susceptible) and SVRS ( Susceptible - Volatile -
Recovered - Susceptible). SVRS is an extension to SIRS . In SVRS , we introduced a new state
called “Volatile” . The reason behind the new state is to make our model generalized for
both single behavior and multiple behavior diffusion. In “multiple behavior" diffusion,
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we incorporated the idea of choosing the behavior/s which, will give an individual the
optimized result. Hence, as she is open to a new behavior, she is “Volatile” in nature.
In chapter 3 on page 27 , we presented our approach and showed how to calculate three
parameters of measuring effectiveness. Three parameters we are using are ,
• Resource Utilization - cumulative amount of resource used in a system by all the
nodes,
• Total Adoption - a summation of all the nodes’ adopted behavior or behaviors. This
is the total sum, which includes all available behavior in the system.
• Unique Adoption - This is summarization of nodes’ adoption of each behavior in
the system. This parameter is important as there can be few nodes in the system
adopting more than one behavior and only “Total Adoption” will not reveal the
real story.
In chapter 4 on page 48 , we presented our experimental results from the epidemic models
and three key observations are summarized below. We run all the duration models on
three synthetic network topologies ( PA, SW , CG). Hence , while summarizing , we are
going to mention the exact duration model and network topology .
• SVS Duration Model : In case of SW and Regular complete graph, we saw that with
increase of graph regularity, utilization drops as more adopted neighbors are re-
quired to perform the adoption.
• SIRS Duration Model: Here an interesting observation is that there is a drop of the
behavior in PA case. The reason being during seed selection, we are choosing those
nodes, which can impart highest influence and eventually have the highest degrees.
Now once those nodes are getting recovered the adoption is getting moved to pe-
ripheral nodes, but these peripheral nodes are not powerful enough to impose back
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the adoption to the seed nodes. Whereas, in case of Smallworld or Complete regu-
lar graph, there remains a group of nodes, which can induce adoption to each other
and the behavior propagates. From the result we can also see that the propagation
is stabler when network is more regular.
• SVRS Duration Model: The difference between SIRS model and this model is that
there is no recovery time and even when the node is infected it is in competition
with other behaviors. As there is no recovery time, even in case of PA, we can see
that the seed node is influencing the peripheral node and the peripheral node are in
turn influencing the seed node and the behavior propagates.
5.2.2 Varying Adoption Cost
In chapter 4 on page 48 , we described how every behavior is associated with a cost and
an individual is able to adopt that behavior only when the social signals from neighbors
are high and individual has resource. A summarized observation in listed below.
• SVS Duration Model :In case of Regular complete graph, we saw the highest increase
in adoption 25.16% with respect to 11% in case of PA and 10.76% for small world.
It shows that reduction of adoption cost can give more boosts to highly connected
individuals.
• SIRS Duration Model: Interesting conclusion is when the recovery duration comes
into play, in both PA and CG we observed a 12% increase in adoption.
• SVRS Duration Model: Similar to SIRS model, there was an overall 12% increase in
adoption.
71
5.2.3 Varying Adoption Threshold
In this thesis, we have used Linear Threshold model to design our behavior diffu-
sion. According to Linear Threshold model every individual has a threshold of adopting
a behavior. In chapter 4 on page 48, one question we targeted is “what happens when the
adoption threshold varies with time?" Note that, we had two assumptions while perform-
ing these experiments. First, each node’s can be more susceptible, threshold can either de-
crease as time progresses and we are taking randomly allotted 70% of the nodes. Second,
threshold of each node can increase with time and we are taking 30% of the nodes. Below
we cumulate all the compelling results and conclusions attained from of our experiments.
• SVS Duration Model : We observed a 4
• SIRS Duration Model: Interestingly, behavior sustained for a longer period of time
in the system with change in threshold.
• SVRS Duration Model: This model was inferred to be the most effective model for
the PA network. First, we observed a 5% increase in resource utilization. Second,
after the first time period, we noted an almost 60% increase in resource utilization.
The reason, being the combination of nodes having both increases and decreases of
thresholds. Hence, we can conclude that diversity in a community will help for
better behavior adoption and sustaining it for a longer period of time.
5.2.4 Varying Resource Availability
In this thesis, one of the questions we investigated is “how varying resource availability
over time can effect behavior/s adoption ? ” In chapter 4 on page 48, we presented the
complete model. Briefly, the idea is, an individual may not have equal resource available
every day of a week. For example, an individual can have 4 hours for social service on
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the weekends but no time during the weekdays. We introduced two variants of resource
availability in this thesis.
5.2.4.1 Weekend Peaks
The main idea behind weekend peaks is that most of the population is having more
resource during the same time. For example, most of the individuals are having more
resources during their weekends than weekdays.
5.2.4.2 Random Peaks
In “Random Peaks" , we built the model in such a way that individuals can have higher
resource on any two consecutive days of the week. For example, in a community, if one
individual is having 4 hours during weekends, another individual may have more time on
Wednesdays and Thursdays.
Taking all variants of resource availability distinctions into account, we conclude all
the experimental results below.
• SVRS Duration Model: Comparing the above-mentioned variants, we observed ini-
tial adoption is higher in case of “Weekend Peaks". As a conclusion, we can say
there is more adoption if most of the individuals have higher resources at the same
period of time. On the other hand, average resource utilization is higher in case of
“Random Peaks". We, thus, concluded that if we target for higher average resource
utilization over a period of time then “Random Peaks" is a better variant.
5.2.5 Varying Global Influence
Till now, in all of the above sections we have been using only local social signals for
behavior diffusion. Therefore, intuitively in this thesis the next question we investigated
is “what happens when the global influence becomes part of the adoption decision and
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varies over time?" For example, an individual now will not only have knowledge about
how many of her neighbors adopted recycling but also about the number of people in her
county who adopted recycling.
We found an additive effect of “varying global influence" with all the other models
used in this thesis.
5.3 Improvements to the frameworks
The task of building a framework that answers questions to “collective human behav-
ior" is a challenging one and this thesis is an effort in presenting a complete framework
to the understanding of “how behavior diffusion changes over time both in case of single
and multiple behaviors".
Below we suggest a few improvements in inference to this thesis.
5.3.1 Network Topologies
We performed all our experiments taking three synthetic topologies (PA, Small-world
and Completed Regular Graph). However, it would be interesting to expand the model
for other real-life networks. For example, it will be intriguing if we can try all the experi-
ments on Obesity Dataset. We can then observe how individuals adopt and drop healthy
behaviors during a course of time.
5.3.2 Representation of Time
In this thesis, we have incorporated several important ideas from varying adoption
cost over time to the importance of varying resource availability over time. We have
constraint time to discrete epochs. However, representation of time can be more intuitive
by thinking it as a 24 hours span.
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5.4 Future directions
We now highlight a few possible future research directions.
5.4.1 Noisy Networks
In a network, we receive social signals from our friends, but there is noise because we
miss messages and or we check them late. In modeling the behavior adoption problem, we
have ignored the role of constraints in how they affect the production and consumption of
messages from peers. Explicit consideration of the cost of social signaling would not only
make the model more realistic but also provide better bounds on the maximal resource
utilization of the networks resources.
5.4.2 Change in population
In this thesis, we considered our network to be a closed network. For example, no
node dies or there is no increase in population. However, it can be a possible extension to
this model. It will not only make the network more dynamic but also will provide better
understanding of behavior extinction from a network in the long term.
5.4.3 Change in behavior
In this thesis, one assumption is the number of behavior remains constant through-
out the propagation of behaviors. Whereas, extending the model to “varying behavior
availability" can provide us with interesting insights.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL DATA
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Table A.1: Design of Experimental Sequence
Exp No. Varying Parameters Fixed Parameters
1 θα θrat i o, c
i , Ri ,GIrat i o
2 θrat i o θα, c
i , Ri ,GIrat i o
Fix θα,rat i o
3 cα cC ,θ
i , Ri ,GIrat i o
4 cC cα,θ
i , Ri ,GIrat i o
Fix cα,C
5 Rα c
i ,θi ,GIrat i o
Fix Rα
6 GIrat i o c
i ,θi , Ri
Fix GIrat i o
7 θα,rat i o X cα,C Rα,GIrat i o
8 θα,rat i o X Rα cα,C ,GIrat i o
9 cα,C X Rα θp ,GIrat i o
10 θα,rat i o X cα,C X Rα GIrat i o
11 θα,rat i o X cα,C X Rα X GIrat i o N/A
Perform the above mentioned 11 experiments for “base model" , “SIR" , “SVRS" ,
“SIRS" on three networks “PA" , “small-world" and “complete graph".
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Experiment to fix threshold variation parameters
We perform an extensive study on threshold variation to identify the threshold drop/gain
and the ratio of population who will have positive or negative impact. By positive impact
of threshold, we mean that the intention to perform a behavior of an individual will in-
crease. Similarly , negative effect of threshold means that the intention to perform a behav-
ior will decrease. In Figure A.6 , we perform alpha variation keeping population ration
as 70 : 30 , i.e 70 % of the population will have positive effect and 30 % of the population
will have negative effect over long time periods. We identify alpha as 0.2 . In Figure A.4 ,
we perform population ratio variation keeping alpha as 0.2.
Table A.2: Terminologies used in experimental sequence design
Symbols Descriptions
θC Threshold with changing
constant.
θα Threshold with changing α
values
θrat i o Ratios are the ratio between
nodes with increasing thresh-
old and nodes with decreas-
ing effect over time.
θp Fixing all the parameter val-
ues for varying threshold θ
cα cost variation
Rα Resource Variation
GI Global Influence Variation
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